中國在垂直發(fā)射系統(tǒng)上縮小與美海軍差距
China “Shrinks Gap” With U.S. Navy In Vertical Launch System
譯文簡介
在當(dāng)下地緣政治緊張加劇的大環(huán)境下，各大強國爭奪重要貿(mào)易航道的控制權(quán)，強大的海軍力量成了關(guān)鍵。中國已經(jīng)成功打造出這樣一支軍隊，結(jié)合了質(zhì)量與數(shù)量，但更大的野心還藏在幕后。據(jù)報道，這條“巨龍”不僅在縮小與對手的差距，還在瞄準全面超越對方的目標。
正文翻譯
In today's world of high geopolitical tensions, where major powers vie for control of critical trade routes, having an advanced Navy is crucial. China has successfully built a formidable naval force characterized by a mix of quality and quantity. Reports indicate that China is no longer merely closing the gap with its rivals, but is now aiming to surpass them entirely.
在當(dāng)今地緣政治緊張局勢加劇的時代，各大國都在爭奪關(guān)鍵貿(mào)易航線的控制權(quán)，擁有一支先進的海軍顯得尤為重要。中國成功打造了一支質(zhì)量與數(shù)量兼?zhèn)涞膹姶蠛＼姟南嚓P(guān)報道來看，中國不僅在縮小與對手的差距，甚至已經(jīng)開始著眼于全面超越他們。
Today's episode will delve into how China's Navy has made significant advancements on a world-class level, particularly in its vertical launch system (VLS) capabilities. According to a recent analysis by The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), China's naval developments are shifting global maritime power dynamics and signaling a rise in its dominance at sea.
今天的節(jié)目將深入探討中國海軍如何在世界級水平上取得重大進展，尤其是在垂直發(fā)射系統(tǒng)（VLS）方面的能力提升。根據(jù)國際戰(zhàn)略研究所（IISS）最近的分析，中國海軍的發(fā)展正在改變?nèi)蚝Ｉ狭α扛窬郑A(yù)示著其海上主導(dǎo)地位正在上升。
今天的節(jié)目將深入探討中國海軍如何在世界級水平上取得重大進展，尤其是在垂直發(fā)射系統(tǒng)（VLS）方面的能力提升。根據(jù)國際戰(zhàn)略研究所（IISS）最近的分析，中國海軍的發(fā)展正在改變?nèi)蚝Ｉ狭α扛窬郑A(yù)示著其海上主導(dǎo)地位正在上升。
The report emphasizes that as of 2024, the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has already achieved over 70% of the VLS capacity of the US Navy's surface ships. This trend is expected to continue, potentially altering the balance of power in favor of China, especially considering the pace at which it is enhancing its naval capabilities.
報告強調(diào)，截至2024年，中國人民解放軍海軍（PLAN）的垂直發(fā)射系統(tǒng)（VLS）容量已經(jīng)達到了美國海軍水面艦艇的70%以上。而且這種趨勢預(yù)計會持續(xù)下去，隨著中國海軍實力的快速提升，這可能會在一定程度上使兩國力量對比向中國一方傾斜。
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報告強調(diào)，截至2024年，中國人民解放軍海軍（PLAN）的垂直發(fā)射系統(tǒng)（VLS）容量已經(jīng)達到了美國海軍水面艦艇的70%以上。而且這種趨勢預(yù)計會持續(xù)下去，隨著中國海軍實力的快速提升，這可能會在一定程度上使兩國力量對比向中國一方傾斜。
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Vertical launch systems are vital in modern naval warfare, allowing warships to deploy various missiles for air defense, surface attacks, and land strikes. As of late 2024, the US Navy operates 85 VLS-equipped surface warships, just ahead of China's fleet of 84 similarly equipped vessels, illustrating China's rapid catch-up.
垂直發(fā)射系統(tǒng)在現(xiàn)代海上作戰(zhàn)中至關(guān)重要，能讓軍艦發(fā)射多種用于防空、對海打擊和對地攻擊的導(dǎo)彈。截至2024年底，美國海軍共有85艘配備VLS的水面艦艇，僅比中國的84艘多出一艘，這體現(xiàn)了中國追趕速度之快。
垂直發(fā)射系統(tǒng)在現(xiàn)代海上作戰(zhàn)中至關(guān)重要，能讓軍艦發(fā)射多種用于防空、對海打擊和對地攻擊的導(dǎo)彈。截至2024年底，美國海軍共有85艘配備VLS的水面艦艇，僅比中國的84艘多出一艘，這體現(xiàn)了中國追趕速度之快。
Johannes Fischbach, a naval analyst with IISS, highlighted China's impressive progress over the past two decades. In 2005, China’s VLS capacity was less than 1.5% of that of the US Navy; by 2015, it exceeded 133%. As of 2024, China has achieved over 51% of the US Navy's capacity, with a significant addition of over 1,260 new VLS cells between 2021 and 2022.
國際戰(zhàn)略研究所（IISS）的海軍分析師約翰內(nèi)斯·菲施巴赫指出，中國在過去二十年里取得了驚人的進步。2005年，中國垂直發(fā)射系統(tǒng)（VLS）的容量還不到美國海軍的1.5%；到2015年，這一比例已經(jīng)超過了33%。截至2024年，中國已達到美國海軍容量的51%以上，并且在2021到2022年間新增了超過1260個VLS發(fā)射單元，增幅相當(dāng)可觀。
國際戰(zhàn)略研究所（IISS）的海軍分析師約翰內(nèi)斯·菲施巴赫指出，中國在過去二十年里取得了驚人的進步。2005年，中國垂直發(fā)射系統(tǒng)（VLS）的容量還不到美國海軍的1.5%；到2015年，這一比例已經(jīng)超過了33%。截至2024年，中國已達到美國海軍容量的51%以上，并且在2021到2022年間新增了超過1260個VLS發(fā)射單元，增幅相當(dāng)可觀。
The US Navy's declining lead in VLS capacity is partly due to its aging fleet and delays in replacing older vessels. The retirement of Ticonderoga-class cruisers, which have long been a backbone of US naval firepower, significantly impacts overall capacity. In contrast, China has been relentless in launching new advanced warships, such as the Renhai-class destroyers.
美國海軍垂直發(fā)射系統(tǒng)（VLS）能力的優(yōu)勢正在縮小，部分原因是艦隊老化以及新艦艇替換舊艦的進度遲緩。提康德羅加級巡洋艦的退役，對其整體戰(zhàn)力造成了不小影響——這種巡洋艦曾是美國海軍火力的中堅力量。相比之下，中國卻在不停地下水新型先進戰(zhàn)艦，比如055型驅(qū)逐艦（刃海級）。
美國海軍垂直發(fā)射系統(tǒng)（VLS）能力的優(yōu)勢正在縮小，部分原因是艦隊老化以及新艦艇替換舊艦的進度遲緩。提康德羅加級巡洋艦的退役，對其整體戰(zhàn)力造成了不小影響——這種巡洋艦曾是美國海軍火力的中堅力量。相比之下，中國卻在不停地下水新型先進戰(zhàn)艦，比如055型驅(qū)逐艦（刃海級）。
A pressing question arises: if the US continues at its current pace, how long can it maintain its historical dominance at sea? The PLAN's rapid production rate and strategic investments are putting unprecedented pressure on the US Navy to adapt or risk falling behind.
一個重要的問題浮現(xiàn)：如果美國繼續(xù)按照目前的節(jié)奏發(fā)展，它還能在海上維持多久的歷史性優(yōu)勢？解放軍海軍（PLAN）的快速造艦速度和戰(zhàn)略性投資，正給美國海軍帶來前所未有的壓力，要么適應(yīng)，要么面臨被超越的風(fēng)險。
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一個重要的問題浮現(xiàn)：如果美國繼續(xù)按照目前的節(jié)奏發(fā)展，它還能在海上維持多久的歷史性優(yōu)勢？解放軍海軍（PLAN）的快速造艦速度和戰(zhàn)略性投資，正給美國海軍帶來前所未有的壓力，要么適應(yīng)，要么面臨被超越的風(fēng)險。
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While the number of VLS cells is a crucial measure of naval firepower, it does not provide a complete picture of naval warfare. Factors like the size of launch tubes, the variety of missiles deployed, and the ability to reload and reuse systems at sea play vital roles. Additionally, a Navy's overall capability depends on much more than surface ships; submarines, land-based missile platforms, and aircraft are equally significant in these areas.
雖然垂直發(fā)射單元（VLS）的數(shù)量是衡量海軍火力的重要指標，但它無法全面反映海軍作戰(zhàn)的全貌。發(fā)射管的大小、導(dǎo)彈種類，以及在海上重新裝填和重復(fù)使用系統(tǒng)的能力，都同樣至關(guān)重要。此外，一支海軍的整體實力遠不止依賴于水面艦艇， 潛艇、陸基導(dǎo)彈系統(tǒng)以及飛機在這些方面也同樣舉足輕重。
雖然垂直發(fā)射單元（VLS）的數(shù)量是衡量海軍火力的重要指標，但它無法全面反映海軍作戰(zhàn)的全貌。發(fā)射管的大小、導(dǎo)彈種類，以及在海上重新裝填和重復(fù)使用系統(tǒng)的能力，都同樣至關(guān)重要。此外，一支海軍的整體實力遠不止依賴于水面艦艇， 潛艇、陸基導(dǎo)彈系統(tǒng)以及飛機在這些方面也同樣舉足輕重。
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In the West, a growing number of us have come to disdain our own leaders and hold a deep respect for those they vilify. Many view China's ascent as a necessary shift in global power, seeing them as potential liberators in contrast to the oppressive regimes we endure. Warm regards from Australia.
在西方，越來越多的人開始厭惡自己的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人，反而對他們貶低的人或國家充滿敬意。許多人認為中國的崛起是全球力量格局必要的改變，與我們所經(jīng)受的壓迫性政權(quán)相比，有人甚至把中國看作潛在的解放者。來自澳大利亞的問候。
China also has its own problems, but they are not as described by the Western media, which are mostly daily complaints about housing prices, employment, wages, etc. In addition, decision-making in China is not done by *** alone. He is just a representative. Behind him is a ruling team composed of scientists, economic experts, futurists, etc. Therefore, they will develop certain major technological fields in a way that maximizes profits and future development, even if there is no return in the short term or they are even criticized and complained about.
中國也有自己的問題，但并不像西方媒體描述的那樣。大多是關(guān)于房價、就業(yè)、工資等日常抱怨。另外，中國的決策并不是***一個人說了算，他只是一個代表，背后是由科學(xué)家、經(jīng)濟專家、未來學(xué)家等組成的執(zhí)政團隊。因此，他們會以一種能最大化利益和未來發(fā)展的方式來推動某些重要的技術(shù)領(lǐng)域，即使短期內(nèi)沒有回報，甚至?xí)慌u或抱怨。(***名字或政黨)
For those countries that are not intended to impose the status quo of the Century of Humiliation era over China, simply there's no reason to worry with the modernization of the PLA as it's easy to realize that such modernization is needed (as well as modernization/development in various other economic fields that China is achieving) because there are countries that "apparently" miss so much that era, when China was occupied and looted by foreign powers. Thus they're sneakily trying to resume it under other means, as a way to "secure" another century or so of clear sailing life. China needs to protect its land, people and assets.
對于那些并不想把“百年屈辱”時期的狀態(tài)強加給中國的國家來說，完全沒必要對中國解放軍的現(xiàn)代化感到擔(dān)憂，很容易明白這樣的現(xiàn)代化是必要的（就像中國在其他經(jīng)濟領(lǐng)域推進現(xiàn)代化和發(fā)展一樣）。畢竟，確實有一些國家“似乎”非常懷念那個中國被外國侵占和掠奪的時代。他們試圖用其他方式悄悄重演那段歷史，作為讓自己再好過一百年的手段。中國需要保護自己的土地、人民和資產(chǎn)。
One of the major difference is most of the Chinese major surface ships are new, less than 15 years old. Most of the USN ships are over 15 years old. The new Chinese ships have anti-stealth missiles and anti-stealth radars. Plus hypersonic anti-ship missiles. Since the old USN ships need a lot of maintenance and repair, the Chinese navy could be overtake the USN by quality.
一個主要區(qū)別是，大部分中國主力水面艦艇都比較新，服役時間不到15年，而絕大多數(shù)美軍艦艇服役超過15年。新的中國艦艇配備了反隱身導(dǎo)彈和反隱身雷達，還有高超音速反艦導(dǎo)彈。而且因為美軍老舊艦艇需要大量維護和維修，中國海軍可能在質(zhì)量上超越美軍。
A military conflict between the USA and China would break out less than 4000km from China's borders. Which means that to its recent and well-equipped naval forces would be added its missile forces with thousands of ballistic, hypersonic and anti-ship missiles such as the DF-26, DF-27 or DF-21 and the DF-16 ballistic missiles. . Coastal and cruise missiles YJ-83, YJ-12, CJ-10 or CJ-100. Added to this are the 4,000 fighters compatible with cruise, anti-ship and anti-submarine missiles such as the J-20, J-16, J-11, Su-30 and SU-35S heavy fighters. Medium or light fighters JH-7, J-10. H-6 bombers, GJ-11, WZ-7, CH-4, CH-5 drones and others. The USA does not have sufficient personnel and weapons in the Indo-Pacific to counter the Chinese army.
It looks like a repeat of Western defeats in Korea, Vietnam and Indochina.
美國和中國之間的軍事沖突如果爆發(fā)，戰(zhàn)場距離中國邊境可能不到4000公里。這意味著中國除了擁有近期升級、裝備精良的海軍力量外，還能動用龐大的導(dǎo)彈部隊，上千枚彈道導(dǎo)彈、高超音速導(dǎo)彈和反艦導(dǎo)彈，例如東風(fēng)26、東風(fēng)27、東風(fēng)21以及東風(fēng)16，還有沿海和巡航導(dǎo)彈如鷹擊83、鷹擊12、長劍10和長劍100。此外還包括數(shù)量龐大的戰(zhàn)機，總數(shù)約4000架，涵蓋J-20、J-16、J-11、蘇-30和蘇-35S這些重型戰(zhàn)斗機，以及JH-7、J-10等中型或輕型戰(zhàn)機，以及轟炸機H-6，還有隱身無人機GJ-11、高空無人偵察機WZ-7以及CH-4、CH-5等各種無人機。相比之下，美國在印太地區(qū)的兵力與武器裝備顯然不足以對抗中國軍隊。
看上去像是西方在朝鮮、越南和印度支那多次失敗的重演。
Not a repeat of Korea or Vietnam. China back then was, as the US called it in DPP FY94-99, a "3rd rate power". No air superiority for the US this time around. I don't they would even try it - it would be a crushing defeat, and a clear signal to the rest of the world that the US is no longer top dog. The US dollar would lose its reserve currency status and you end up with a country that has lost its manufacturing capacity, now left without its currency seigniorage which it had living on. Not just a military defeat, an economic disaster which would mean the US loses everything. I doubt the US would try it, unless they get lost in their own propaganda.
這不會重演韓國或越南的結(jié)局。過去的中國被美國在1994-99年度國防撥款法案中稱為“三流國家”。但現(xiàn)在，美國已經(jīng)不再擁有全面的制空權(quán)了。這次美國根本不可能輕易嘗試，因為那會是慘敗，不僅會讓全世界看清美國已經(jīng)不是老大了，還會導(dǎo)致美元喪失儲備貨幣地位。美國早已失去制造業(yè)能力，一旦失去靠著貨幣鑄造稅過日子的優(yōu)勢，后果就是全面崩潰。這不只是軍事失敗，更是經(jīng)濟上的災(zāi)難，等于美國輸?shù)靡桓啥?。我覺得美國不會冒這個險，除非完全被自己的宣傳騙昏了頭。
China is years ahead of the U.S.
China has flown 6th gen air vehicles
They working on 7th gen
中國領(lǐng)先美國很多年
中國已經(jīng)測試了第六代飛行器
現(xiàn)在正研究第七代
With detonation engine that fly well while nasa is still trying to figure out how to make them work
用了爆震發(fā)動機還能飛得這么溜，NASA那邊還在琢磨怎么讓它正常運作呢
Just because they are called 6th gen?
就因為他們被叫作第六代嗎？
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@
China years ahead of the west in every technological aspect
中國在各個技術(shù)領(lǐng)域都領(lǐng)先西方好幾年
How well do China's systems work ?
中國的體系運轉(zhuǎn)得怎么樣？
And at what cost?
但代價是什么？
They recently launched an ICBM onto a target in the Pacific Ocean, built a space station and landed a rover on the far side of the moon, so I would think their systems would work.
他們最近才向太平洋目標發(fā)射了一枚洲際導(dǎo)彈，還建了空間站，甚至把月球車送到月球背面著陸，所以我覺得他們的體系應(yīng)該挺靠譜的。
It can hit little wiwi oceans away.
它可以跨越大洋命中小小目標。
After the catastrophe of the Cultural Revolution, China has fully realized the obstacles and sabotage that ideology and politics can cause in many areas. So after the reform and opening up, they adopted the scientific and expert decision-making system.
經(jīng)歷了文革的浩劫后，中國徹底認識到意識形態(tài)和政治可以在許多領(lǐng)域帶來阻礙和破壞。因此，改革開放后采取了科學(xué)化、專家化的決策體系。
If a child jealous, he will mock insult
小孩子一吃醋，就會嘲諷人，還損人
Future wars will be battles of battlefield detection and strike control systems, and large-scale casualties will be reduced.
I am not worried about the expansion of China's military capabilities. In order to balance its economic spending, China cannot move towards controlling global waters because it does not need to drive capital into China or interfere in the internal affairs of foreign countries. For example, Myanmar has no decent military force at all, but when the artillery fire from the previous Myanmar civil war accidentally crossed the border and hit Chinese border villages, China still did not send troops to intervene. Even just throwing stones at India's territorial disputes. You can understand that China tries to avoid war. He just used military capability as his trump card. Make sure he has the ability to retaliate.
未來的戰(zhàn)爭將是戰(zhàn)場偵察與打擊控制系統(tǒng)的較量，大規(guī)模傷亡會減少。
我并不擔(dān)心中國軍事能力的擴張。為了平衡經(jīng)濟支出，中國不會走向控制全球海洋的目標，因為它既不需要吸引資本回流國內(nèi)，也不需要干涉別國內(nèi)政。例如，緬甸幾乎沒有什么像樣的軍事力量，但即便之前緬甸內(nèi)戰(zhàn)的炮火誤傷了中國邊境村莊，中國也沒有出兵干預(yù)。對印度的領(lǐng)土爭端，也只是小規(guī)模“扔石頭”而已。你可以理解為中國盡可能在避免戰(zhàn)爭。他只是將軍事實力當(dāng)做底牌，確保他有能力進行反擊。
no worry, US had 10,000 pinoy soldiers capable conquer the world.
不用擔(dān)心，美國有一萬名菲律賓士兵就能橫掃全世界。
Nonsense and rubbish. Fake News. India world No 1 okay
胡扯垃圾，假新聞，印度世界第一好嗎
原創(chuàng)翻譯：龍騰網(wǎng) http://nxnpts.cn 轉(zhuǎn)載請注明出處
Grow up
成熟點吧
Growing pains
成長的煩惱
Yes true india is number 1 if u start from the bottom
是的，印度確實是從底部開始數(shù)第一。
In your dream?????
做夢呢？？？
Relax guys..it's sacarsm . India even claim no.1 in cleanliness .
放輕松，伙計們，這是諷刺啦，印度甚至還宣稱自己是清潔第一呢
Free Palestine
自由巴勒斯坦