The Navy’s amphibious fleet is in such a sorry state that half of the ships are declared to be in “poor condition” and not on track to serve for the entirety of their service lives. In addition, the sea service will struggle to maintain a fleet of at least 31 amphibs into the 2030s as required by law.

海軍的兩棲艦隊(duì)狀況極為糟糕，甚至有一半的艦船被宣告為“狀況不佳”，并且無(wú)法在其整個(gè)服役期內(nèi)繼續(xù)服役。此外，海軍將很難保持至少31艘兩棲艦艇的規(guī)模，以滿足其要求，直到2030年代。

Those are some of the grim findings of a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on the state of the Navy’s 32 amphibious assault ships (LHD/LHA), dock landing ships (LSD) and amphibious transport docks, (LPD), which come together to form Amphibious Ready Groups (ARG) that transport Marines, their aircraft and other vehicles across the seas.

這些是美國(guó)政府問(wèn)責(zé)辦公室（GAO）報(bào)告中的一些嚴(yán)峻發(fā)現(xiàn)，報(bào)告指出海軍32艘兩棲攻擊艦（LHD/LHA）、船塢登陸艦（LSD）和兩棲運(yùn)輸船塢（LPD）的現(xiàn)狀，這些艦艇共同組成兩棲應(yīng)急分隊(duì)（ARG），將海軍陸戰(zhàn)隊(duì)員、他們的飛機(jī)和其他車(chē)輛運(yùn)輸?shù)胶Ｉ稀?/b>

Without these ships, which are based in San Diego, Little Creek, Virginia, and Sasebo, Japan, Marines can struggle to deploy or train, and Tuesday’s GAO report lays out how bad the fleet has gotten, and how hard it will be to get it back on a proper course.

沒(méi)有這些艦艇（它們分別駐扎在圣地亞哥、弗吉尼亞州的小溪以及日本的佐世保），海軍陸戰(zhàn)隊(duì)將難以執(zhí)行部署或訓(xùn)練。而周二的GAO報(bào)告詳細(xì)闡述了艦隊(duì)的糟糕狀況，并指出要將其恢復(fù)到正常狀態(tài)將面臨的困難。

The GAO highlights a host of longstanding problems that have afflicted the entire fleet to varying degrees, including chronic maintenance delays, competing budget priorities, ill-planned early-retirement efforts that went forward without required congressional approval, scarce spare parts, shoddy contractor oversight and other issues.

政府問(wèn)責(zé)辦公室（GAO）指出了長(zhǎng)期困擾整個(gè)艦隊(duì)的眾多問(wèn)題，具體包括長(zhǎng)期的維護(hù)延遲、預(yù)算優(yōu)先事項(xiàng)沖突、未經(jīng)國(guó)會(huì)批準(zhǔn)就推進(jìn)的早期退休計(jì)劃、零部件短缺、承包商監(jiān)督不力以及其他問(wèn)題。

But the report does not address the Marine Corps’ original Force Design 2030 vision, which involved sweeping changes to the Corps to ready Marines for a fight in the Pacific. Under the original proposed doctrine, far less emphasis would be placed on large-scale beach landings centered around a few dozen amphibious ships and more would be put into Marines operating in smaller groups, and possibly from smaller amphibious vessels, distributed across a vast battle space. This put the future of traditional amphibs in doubt, but that vision has since been watered down due to competing interests, including the demands of Congress, and the amphibious assault vessels have remained a priority for the Navy and the USMC.

然而，報(bào)告并未涉及海軍陸戰(zhàn)隊(duì)的原始《2030年部隊(duì)設(shè)計(jì)》愿景，該愿景涉及對(duì)海軍陸戰(zhàn)隊(duì)進(jìn)行廣泛改革，以準(zhǔn)備迎接太平洋地區(qū)的戰(zhàn)斗。在最初的提案中，重心不再放在依賴(lài)少數(shù)幾艘兩棲艦進(jìn)行的大規(guī)模灘頭登陸上，而是轉(zhuǎn)向讓海軍陸戰(zhàn)隊(duì)員在較小的團(tuán)隊(duì)中行動(dòng)，可能使用較小的兩棲艦艇，并分布在廣闊的戰(zhàn)區(qū)內(nèi)。這使得傳統(tǒng)兩棲艦的未來(lái)充滿不確定性，但由于利益沖突，包括國(guó)會(huì)的要求，這一愿景已經(jīng)被削弱，兩棲攻擊艦仍然是海軍和海軍陸戰(zhàn)隊(duì)的優(yōu)先事項(xiàng)。

Two-high profile amphib failures this year showcased the real-world consequences of the fleet’s ongoing issues. The Boxer ARG, composed of USS Boxer (LHD-4), USS Somerset (LPD-25) and USS Harpers Ferry (LSD-49), all experienced maintenance delays and were unable to deploy as planned in September 2023. Boxer couldn’t go until April 2024 and had to turn around and return to San Diego just days into its Pacific cruise due to a starboard rudder issue. After that, Boxer didn’t resume its deployment until July 2024, 10 months after it was supposed to head out.

今年兩次高調(diào)的兩棲艦失敗展示了艦隊(duì)持續(xù)問(wèn)題的現(xiàn)實(shí)后果。由USS Boxer（LHD-4）、USS Somerset（LPD-25）和USS Harpers Ferry（LSD-49）組成的博克斯應(yīng)急分隊(duì)（ARG）都經(jīng)歷了維護(hù)延遲，未能按計(jì)劃在2023年9月部署。博克斯號(hào)直到2024年4月才能啟航，并在太平洋巡航開(kāi)始幾天后因右舷舵問(wèn)題而被迫返回圣地亞哥。之后，博克斯號(hào)直到2024年7月才恢復(fù)部署，遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)晚于原定的出航時(shí)間。

ARG leaders later highlighted the training they were still able to do on deployment, but the GAO notes that, with Boxer unavailable, “the Marine Corps was unable to deploy the full 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit and lacked the capabilities provided by F-35 fighter aircraft.”

應(yīng)急分隊(duì)的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者后來(lái)強(qiáng)調(diào)了他們?cè)诓渴疬^(guò)程中仍能進(jìn)行的訓(xùn)練，但GAO指出，由于博克斯號(hào)無(wú)法出海，“海軍陸戰(zhàn)隊(duì)未能部署完整的第15海軍陸戰(zhàn)遠(yuǎn)征部隊(duì)，且缺乏F-35戰(zhàn)斗機(jī)提供的能力?！?/b>

The USS America (LHA-6) ARG was unable to patrol as a full group this year due to a lack of the three ships required for a full ARG, resulting in the Navy and Marine Corps missing exercises and creating a presence gap in the group’s assigned area of responsibility, the report states.

報(bào)告還指出，USS America（LHA-6）號(hào)應(yīng)急分隊(duì)由于缺少執(zhí)行完整任務(wù)所需的三艘艦艇，未能作為完整的編隊(duì)執(zhí)行巡邏任務(wù)，導(dǎo)致海軍和海軍陸戰(zhàn)隊(duì)錯(cuò)過(guò)了演習(xí)，并在該分隊(duì)的責(zé)任區(qū)內(nèi)出現(xiàn)了存在空白。

The Navy has also been down an additional amphib since a 2020 port fire, and bungled response, destroyed the USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD-6).

海軍自2020年港口火災(zāi)及其糟糕的應(yīng)對(duì)措施摧毀了USS Bonhomme Richard（LHD-6）以來(lái)，還少了一艘兩棲艦。

Such readiness issues are not new in the fleet, according to the GAO, which cites Marine Corps records showing that the Navy had to extend 71 percent of its amphib depot maintenance periods from 2010 to 2021, and that this cost the Marines nearly 29 years in lost training and deployment time.

根據(jù)GAO的報(bào)告，這種準(zhǔn)備狀態(tài)問(wèn)題在艦隊(duì)中并不新鮮，報(bào)告引用了海軍陸戰(zhàn)隊(duì)的記錄，顯示從2010年到2021年，海軍不得不延長(zhǎng)71%的兩棲艦維修周期，這導(dǎo)致海軍陸戰(zhàn)隊(duì)損失了近29年的訓(xùn)練和部署時(shí)間。

Marine Corps leaders have diplomatically expressed frustration with the Navy’s inability to get its amphib house in order, even as the two services continue to hammer out an amphibious fleet plan for the future that will help mitigate such shortcomings.

盡管兩軍仍在制定未來(lái)的兩棲艦隊(duì)計(jì)劃以彌補(bǔ)這些不足，海軍陸戰(zhàn)隊(duì)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人已表達(dá)了對(duì)海軍未能理順兩棲艦問(wèn)題的外交性沮喪。

Then-Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps Gen. Eric Smith told reporters in July 2023 that four of the last five ARG deployments had failed to go on time.

時(shí)任海軍陸戰(zhàn)隊(duì)副指揮官的埃里克·史密斯將軍在2023年7月告訴記者，過(guò)去五次中的四次兩棲應(yīng)急分隊(duì)（ARG）部署未能按時(shí)進(jìn)行。

“Did they have their full amount of training days? Did they have their full integration period? And did they deploy together as an ARG-MEU? If they couldn’t do that [then] we have a readiness problem,” Smith, who is now the Marine Corps commandant, told Breaking Defense’s Justin Katz.

“他們是否獲得了足夠的訓(xùn)練天數(shù)？是否有足夠的整合期？是否作為一個(gè)ARG-MEU（兩棲應(yīng)急分隊(duì)-海軍陸戰(zhàn)隊(duì)遠(yuǎn)征部隊(duì)）一起部署？如果他們不能做到這一點(diǎn)，那么我們就存在準(zhǔn)備狀態(tài)問(wèn)題，”史密斯將軍（現(xiàn)為海軍陸戰(zhàn)隊(duì)指揮官）對(duì)《Breaking Defense》的賈斯汀·凱茨說(shuō)。

Navy Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Lisa Franchetti said at an event at the Stimson Center think tank Tuesday that the Navy was eventually able to deploy the Boxer, and that the deployment was extended so that the Marines could get through their training requirements.

海軍作戰(zhàn)部長(zhǎng)麗莎·弗朗切蒂海軍上將于周二在斯廷森中心智庫(kù)的一次活動(dòng)中表示，海軍最終能夠部署博克斯號(hào)，并且部署期限被延長(zhǎng)，以便海軍陸戰(zhàn)隊(duì)完成其訓(xùn)練要求。


She said the services are working to understand how they can work through maintenance challenges without impeding Marine training or certifications, and that the Navy has funded the purchase of new amphibs.

她表示，海軍和海軍陸戰(zhàn)隊(duì)正在努力了解如何克服維修挑戰(zhàn)，同時(shí)不妨礙海軍陸戰(zhàn)隊(duì)的訓(xùn)練和認(rèn)證，并且海軍已經(jīng)為購(gòu)買(mǎi)新型兩棲艦提供了資金支持。

“We’re committed, locked shields, in everything we do,” she said, adding that such ships are “a capability we need all around the world, every single day.”

她說(shuō)：“我們承諾，肩并肩，做好我們的一切工作?！辈⒀a(bǔ)充道，這些艦艇是“我們?nèi)蛎恳惶於夹枰哪芰ΡＵ?。?/b>

Two Navy reviews commenced this spring and in 2023, when Franchetti was vice chief of naval operations, seeking to get a full picture of “the wide range of problems affecting readiness in the amphibious fleet,” but the GAO notes that the sea service “has made little progress in addressing these challenges.”

兩項(xiàng)海軍審查工作分別于今年春季和2023年啟動(dòng)，當(dāng)時(shí)弗朗切蒂還是海軍作戰(zhàn)副部長(zhǎng)，旨在全面了解“影響兩棲艦隊(duì)準(zhǔn)備狀態(tài)的各種問(wèn)題”，但GAO指出，海軍在解決這些挑戰(zhàn)方面“進(jìn)展甚微”。

Ship age and other factors means the Navy will have a hard time meeting its statutory requirement to have at least 31 amphibs going forward, the GAO report states. The service currently has 32 amphibs in its fleet and is mulling service-life extensions to keep the fleet at 31 vessels, but the GAO found that such work will cost up to $1 billion a ship, and that six ships will need such extensions in the next 30 years “amid rising ship construction costs and maintenance backlogs.”

船齡及其他因素意味著海軍將難以滿足其法定要求，即在未來(lái)保持至少31艘兩棲艦，GAO報(bào)告指出。海軍目前擁有32艘兩棲艦，并正在考慮延長(zhǎng)這些艦艇的服役期以保持艦隊(duì)規(guī)模在31艘，但GAO發(fā)現(xiàn)，這一工作每艘船的費(fèi)用可能高達(dá)10億美元，且未來(lái)30年將有六艘船需要進(jìn)行此類(lèi)延長(zhǎng)，“與此同時(shí)，船舶建造成本上升和維修積壓的情況也在增加”。

The GAO also notes that the Navy maintaining at least 31 amphibs does not mean these ships are good to deploy or train: “In some cases, ships within the amphibious warfare fleet have not been available to support Marine Corps operations and training for years at a time.”

GAO還指出，海軍保持至少31艘兩棲艦并不意味著這些艦艇可以隨時(shí)投入部署或訓(xùn)練：“在一些情況下，兩棲艦隊(duì)中的艦艇已有多年未能支持海軍陸戰(zhàn)隊(duì)的操作和訓(xùn)練。”

Several amphibs cited in the report highlight these ongoing issues.

報(bào)告中列舉的幾艘兩棲艦突顯了這些持續(xù)存在的問(wèn)題。
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USS Wasp (LHD 1), the oldest LHD class ship in the fleet at 35 years, is struggling to get parts for its conventional steam propulsion system. This is doubly concerning as the Navy mulls the possibility of extending the service lives of its LHDs beyond their 40 years to maintain fleet size.

USS Wasp（LHD 1），艦隊(duì)中最老的LHD級(jí)艦艇，已有35年艦齡，正面臨難以為其傳統(tǒng)蒸汽推進(jìn)系統(tǒng)找到零部件的問(wèn)題。這一問(wèn)題令人更加擔(dān)憂，因?yàn)楹＼娬诳紤]是否延長(zhǎng)其LHD艦艇的服役期，超出40年以維持艦隊(duì)規(guī)模。


“However, officials stated that replacing steam propulsion plants is not currently a part of this effort, so the Navy will need to continue maintaining them on LHD ships,” the report states, adding that the Navy is “taking some measures to address obsolescence issues with the machinery control systems” on LHDs LHAs starting this fiscal year.

報(bào)告指出：“盡管官員們表示，替換蒸汽推進(jìn)系統(tǒng)目前并不在此項(xiàng)工作計(jì)劃之內(nèi)，海軍仍將需要繼續(xù)對(duì)LHD艦艇上的蒸汽推進(jìn)系統(tǒng)進(jìn)行維護(hù)?！眻?bào)告補(bǔ)充說(shuō)，海軍“正在采取一些措施來(lái)解決LHD和LHA上的機(jī)械控制系統(tǒng)的老化問(wèn)題”，從本財(cái)政年度開(kāi)始進(jìn)行相關(guān)工作。

New amphibs aren’t immune to travails, either. Less than three years into its service, the USS Fort Lauderdale (LPD 28) “is already facing limitations with its use in part because of poor equipment design,” according to the GAO. Ship and maintenance officials reported that the USS Fort Lauderdale faced challenges with the knuckle boom crane and the mechanical arm used to launch rigid hull inflatable boats (RHIB), which had high failure rates coupled with increased costs and ordering delays for parts.

新的兩棲艦也并非沒(méi)有困難。根據(jù)GAO的報(bào)告，USS Fort Lauderdale（LPD 28）服役不到三年，“由于設(shè)備設(shè)計(jì)不良，已面臨部分使用限制”。船舶和維修官員報(bào)告稱(chēng)，USS Fort Lauderdale面臨著起重臂和機(jī)械臂的問(wèn)題，這些設(shè)備用于發(fā)射剛性船體充氣艇（RHIB），但故障率高，并且零部件的成本增加、訂購(gòu)延誤。

What’s more, fuel and ballast tank level indicators were improperly calibrated and unreliable, and sailors didn’t have the information needed to calibrate the ship’s tank level indicators, resulting in the Navy having to fly in contractors every time a part needed recalibrating.

此外，燃料和壓載艙的液位指示器校準(zhǔn)不當(dāng)且不可靠，船員無(wú)法獲得所需信息來(lái)校準(zhǔn)艦船的液位指示器，導(dǎo)致每當(dāng)需要重新校準(zhǔn)零部件時(shí)，海軍不得不飛來(lái)承包商進(jìn)行維修。

“The ship and maintenance officials stated that some LPD system sextion choices involve proprietary parts that prevent the ship’s technicians from being able to maintain certain items, such as the fiber optic navigation lights,” the report states.

報(bào)告指出：“船舶和維修官員表示，部分LPD系統(tǒng)選擇涉及專(zhuān)有零件，這些零件阻止船舶技術(shù)人員對(duì)某些設(shè)備進(jìn)行維護(hù)，比如光纖導(dǎo)航燈?！?/b>

Aboard the USS Essex (LHD 2), shoddy contractor work and poor Navy oversight resulted in welds having to be redone because of a lack of quality assurance oversights, resulting in “extensive rework and delays to the repair period.”

在USS Essex（LHD 2）上，由于承包商的糟糕工作和海軍監(jiān)督不力，焊接需要重新進(jìn)行，因?yàn)槿狈|(zhì)量保證的監(jiān)督，導(dǎo)致“大量返工并延遲了維修周期”。

Part of the amphibious fleet’s poor condition stems from a prior Navy decision to cancel maintenance for a sizable portion of the fleet. The Navy planned as recently as 2022 to divest 10 of its LSDs, nearly a third of the fleet, before the end of their respective service lives.

兩棲艦隊(duì)狀況不佳的一部分原因來(lái)源于海軍此前決定取消對(duì)大部分艦艇的維修。海軍曾計(jì)劃在2022年之前，將其近三分之一的LSD艦艇出售，甚至在它們的服役期限結(jié)束之前就進(jìn)行處置。

Congress came back in December 2022 and prohibited the Navy from spending money to divest a portion of those ships, so the Navy had to continue operating them, “even though it had already canceled the required maintenance periods,” according to the GAO.

根據(jù)GAO的報(bào)告，國(guó)會(huì)在2022年12月介入，禁止海軍花費(fèi)資金出售這些艦艇中的一部分，因此海軍不得不繼續(xù)運(yùn)營(yíng)這些艦艇，“盡管海軍已取消了所需的維修周期”。

“As a result, these LSD class ships fell into further disrepair, which compounded the amount of work the Navy needs to complete in future maintenance periods,” the report states. “In 2023, the Navy found that seven of 13 incidents that affected amphibious fleet readiness were lixed to LSD diesel engine problems resulting from deferred maintenance.”

報(bào)告指出：“因此，這些LSD級(jí)艦艇進(jìn)一步陷入了惡化，增加了海軍在未來(lái)維修周期中需要完成的工作量?！眻?bào)告繼續(xù)提到：“2023年，海軍發(fā)現(xiàn)，影響兩棲艦隊(duì)?wèi)?zhàn)備的13起事件中，有7起與LSD柴油發(fā)動(dòng)機(jī)問(wèn)題有關(guān)，這些問(wèn)題源于延遲維修?！?/b>

Canceling these maintenance plans created a backlog of maintenance work that the Navy cannot realistically complete, the report adds.

取消這些維修計(jì)劃導(dǎo)致了維修工作的積壓，海軍無(wú)法實(shí)際完成這些工作。

GAO also found that, in some cases, deferring maintenance resulted in the Navy having to retire amphibious ships earlier than planned. The USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43) was retired in 2021, six years before the end of its service life, and Navy maintenance officials described the vessel as “a poorly maintained ship that had accumulated a significant backlog (i.e., approximately $146 million) of deferred maintenance at the time of divestment.”

GAO還發(fā)現(xiàn)，在某些情況下，推遲維修導(dǎo)致海軍不得不提前退役兩棲艦艇。USS Fort McHenry（LSD 43）于2021年提前六年退役，遠(yuǎn)早于原定的服役期限，海軍維修官員將該艦描述為“一艘維護(hù)不善的艦船，退役時(shí)積累了大量未處理的維修任務(wù)（大約1.46億美元）?！?/b>

The Navy also struggles to meet its amphibious availability goals because maintenance does not happen on time, a problem that has plagued the Navy overall for years. Just three of 14 depot maintenance periods undertaken between Fiscal Years 2020 to 2022 were done on time, resulting in more than 1,200 days of cumulative delays.

海軍還面臨著達(dá)成兩棲艦艇可用性目標(biāo)的困難，因?yàn)榫S修未能按時(shí)進(jìn)行，這一問(wèn)題已經(jīng)困擾海軍多年。在2020財(cái)政年到2022財(cái)政年期間，海軍進(jìn)行的14次工廠維修中，只有3次按時(shí)完成，導(dǎo)致累計(jì)延誤超過(guò)1200天。
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“Maintenance delays can result in cascading delays to training and, ultimately, deployment,” GAO states. “Additionally, in total, the maintenance periods cost $400 million more than the original contract value for the efforts.”

GAO指出：“維修延誤可能導(dǎo)致訓(xùn)練的連鎖延遲，最終影響部署?！贝送?，“總的來(lái)說(shuō)，維修周期的費(fèi)用比原始合同金額多出4億美元?！?/b>

GAO had identified such problems in late 2022 as it pertained to generating carrier strike groups. The watchdog recommended the Navy identify measures of success and performance in its ready-ship producing processes, but that recommendation remained unresolved as of September 2024.

GAO在2022年底曾發(fā)現(xiàn)類(lèi)似問(wèn)題，特別是在生成航母打擊群方面。監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)建議海軍在其備戰(zhàn)艦船生產(chǎn)過(guò)程中確定成功和績(jī)效的衡量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，但截至2024年9月，這一建議仍未解決。

Like the Marines’ Force Design 2030 vision, some outside analysts question if the Navy even needs such a sizable amphibious fleet, given the fact that those large ships are unlikely to be landing huge numbers of Marines under fire during a peer fight in the Pacific.

與海軍陸戰(zhàn)隊(duì)的《2030年力量設(shè)計(jì)》愿景類(lèi)似，一些外部分析人士質(zhì)疑海軍是否仍然需要如此龐大的兩棲艦隊(duì)，考慮到這些大型艦船在太平洋的對(duì)等戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)中不太可能在敵火中進(jìn)行大規(guī)模的登陸作戰(zhàn)。

When it comes to the China threat, it’s highly unlikely that the kind of amphibious force provided by an ARG would be used to conduct an amphibious invasion, given Beijing’s targeting and weapons delivery systems, according to Bradley Martin, a retired surface warfare officer who spent two-thirds of his 30-year career at sea.

關(guān)于中國(guó)威脅，退役水面作戰(zhàn)軍官布拉德利·馬丁（Bradley Martin）表示，由于北京的靶向和武器投送系統(tǒng)，ARG提供的兩棲力量在進(jìn)行兩棲入侵時(shí)的使用可能性非常低，而他自己有30年的海上服役經(jīng)驗(yàn)，其中有三分之二的時(shí)間在海上度過(guò)。

“That’s not gonna happen,” Martin, now a policy researcher at the RAND think tank, told TWZ.

布拉德利·馬丁（Bradley Martin）如今是蘭德研究所的政策研究員，他在接受《TWZ》采訪時(shí)表示：“這不可能發(fā)生?！?/b>

Still, he noted that ARGs and MEUs can provide a variety of useful missions elsewhere in the world, including seizure of advanced bases, raids, reconnaissance, sea basing, supporting lower-intensity conflicts, and non-combatant evacuations, including in areas where China and Russia have major interest.

盡管如此，他指出，兩棲攻擊艦和海軍陸戰(zhàn)隊(duì)遠(yuǎn)征單位（MEUs）可以在全球其他地區(qū)提供多種有用的任務(wù)，包括占領(lǐng)先進(jìn)基地、突襲、偵察、海上基地支持、低強(qiáng)度沖突支持和撤離非戰(zhàn)斗人員，包括在中國(guó)和俄羅斯有重要利益的地區(qū)。

Amphibious assault ships upgraded to carry F-35 fighter jets could play a role in a China fight by serving as part of the Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) construct, which would involve keeping China guessing as to where such aircraft are operating from. Go here to read TWZ’s past coverage of EABO.

升級(jí)為可搭載F-35戰(zhàn)斗機(jī)的兩棲攻擊艦在與中國(guó)的對(duì)抗中可能發(fā)揮作用，成為遠(yuǎn)征先進(jìn)基地作戰(zhàn)（EABO）結(jié)構(gòu)的一部分，這將涉及讓中國(guó)無(wú)法確定這些飛機(jī)的具體出發(fā)地點(diǎn)。點(diǎn)擊此處閱讀TWZ對(duì)EABO的往期報(bào)道。

The Navy and Marines would benefit from better defining and scoping the missions they want an ARG and its embarked MEU to take on, according to Martin.

馬丁認(rèn)為，海軍和海軍陸戰(zhàn)隊(duì)?wèi)?yīng)更好地定義和確定它們希望兩棲攻擊群（ARG）及其遠(yuǎn)征單位（MEU）承擔(dān)的任務(wù)。

“This will allow more focused attention on real-world needs,” he said. “This could lead to better definition of readiness and force structure requirements.”

他說(shuō)：“這將使我們能更有針對(duì)性地關(guān)注現(xiàn)實(shí)世界的需求，這可能會(huì)有助于更好地定義備戰(zhàn)狀態(tài)和部隊(duì)結(jié)構(gòu)要求?！?/b>

Whether the Navy is planning how to use its ARGs in a China fight remains unclear. The GAO report gives a quick mention to “a modernization effort intended to increase the ship’s relevance in the future operating environment by expanding weapons, radar and other capabilities,” that could portend readying that fleet for such a contingency, but the Navy is in the early stages of planning for this effort and had not developed budget estimates for the effort.

是否海軍正在規(guī)劃如何在與中國(guó)的沖突中使用其兩棲攻擊群仍不清楚。GAO報(bào)告簡(jiǎn)要提到了一項(xiàng)“現(xiàn)代化努力，旨在通過(guò)擴(kuò)展武器、雷達(dá)和其他能力，增加艦船在未來(lái)作戰(zhàn)環(huán)境中的相關(guān)性”，這可能預(yù)示著該艦隊(duì)為應(yīng)對(duì)這種突發(fā)情況做好準(zhǔn)備，但海軍仍處于規(guī)劃的初期階段，且尚未制定該努力的預(yù)算估算。

GAO’s latest report lays bare the extent of the amphibious fleet’s problems. How the Navy, Marine Corps, the Pentagon and Congress will respond to these problems, and their myriad of causes, remains to be seen.

GAO的最新報(bào)告揭示了兩棲艦隊(duì)問(wèn)題的嚴(yán)重程度。海軍、海軍陸戰(zhàn)隊(duì)、五角大樓和國(guó)會(huì)如何回應(yīng)這些問(wèn)題及其眾多根源，仍有待觀察。