The Russian missile at the center of an unprecedented strike on the Ukrainian city of Dnipro earlier today has been identified by Russia’s President Vladimir Putin as an alleged new weapon, named Oreshnik. After the strike, the missile had been widely — although not conclusively — identified as the RS-26 Rubezh. Development work on this mysterious strategic weapon system was supposedly halted in 2018, although the Pentagon now states that whatever missile was used today in Dnipro was based on the RS-26, suggesting the design was revived at least to a degree, and has now been used in combat.

今天早些時(shí)候，烏克蘭城市第聶伯遭遇了一次前所未有的打擊，俄羅斯總統(tǒng)弗拉基米爾·普京將實(shí)施這次打擊的導(dǎo)彈稱為一種名為“奧列什尼克”（Oreshnik）的新武器。然而，大部分分析（盡管尚未完全確認(rèn)）認(rèn)為，這枚導(dǎo)彈實(shí)際上是RS-26“邊界”（Rubezh）中程彈道導(dǎo)彈。該神秘戰(zhàn)略武器系統(tǒng)的研發(fā)工作據(jù)稱已于2018年停止，但五角大樓表示，這次用于第聶伯打擊的導(dǎo)彈基于RS-26的設(shè)計(jì)，這表明其設(shè)計(jì)至少在某種程度上被重新啟用，并且現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)用于實(shí)戰(zhàn)。

First off, it’s worth recalling that the RS-26 is widely viewed as an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), a class of weapon that has a range of somewhere between approximately 1,860 and 3,410 miles — based on the ranges it achieved in tests. However, Russia has previously described it as an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), a type of weapon that can hit targets at more than around 3,410 miles.

首先，需要回顧的是，RS-26通常被認(rèn)為是一種中程彈道導(dǎo)彈（IRBM），其射程根據(jù)測(cè)試結(jié)果大約在2,993 km到5,489 km 之間。然而，俄羅斯此前將其描述為一枚洲際彈道導(dǎo)彈（ICBM），這類武器的射程通常超過 5,489km。
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*Ok, two reasons why I think Russia probably used a variant of the long-gestating RS-26 Rubezh IRBM: (1) Russia hinted that it resumed development of the RS-26 this summer and (2) that's what the Ukrainians predicated a day ago, down to the launch site.

*X上注解：
我認(rèn)為俄羅斯很可能使用了長(zhǎng)期研發(fā)的RS-26“邊界”中程彈道導(dǎo)彈（IRBM）的改進(jìn)型，原因有以下兩點(diǎn)：
1.俄羅斯在今年夏天暗示已恢復(fù)RS-26的研發(fā)工作；
2.烏克蘭一天前就對(duì)此進(jìn)行了預(yù)測(cè)，甚至準(zhǔn)確指出了發(fā)射地點(diǎn)。

The reason for this discrepancy likely lies primarily in Russia having sought to remain within the limits of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which outlawed ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 500 to 5,500 kilometers (310 and 3,410 miles). The INF collapsed in 2019.

這一差異的主要原因可能在于俄羅斯試圖保持在《中程核力量條約》（INF）的限制范圍內(nèi)。該條約禁止射程在500至5,500公里（310至3,410英里）之間的彈道導(dǎo)彈和巡航導(dǎo)彈。然而，該條約已于2019年失效。
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However, it could explain why the Ukrainian military initially reported that the missile that struck Dnipro was an ICBM — a claim that many Western officials subsequently denied, pointing instead to the RS-26 or an RS-26 derivative.

然而，這也可能解釋了為什么烏克蘭軍方最初報(bào)告稱，襲擊第聶伯的導(dǎo)彈是一枚洲際彈道導(dǎo)彈（ICBM）。這一說法隨后被許多西方官員否認(rèn)，他們更傾向于認(rèn)為這是一枚RS-26導(dǎo)彈或其改進(jìn)型。

Regardless, there is now a growing consensus that the missile used was a conventionally armed IRBM based on the RS-26. The launch site appears to have been Kapustin Yar, roughly 500 miles from the target.

無(wú)論如何，現(xiàn)在越來(lái)越多的共識(shí)認(rèn)為，使用的導(dǎo)彈是一枚基于RS-26的常規(guī)武裝中程彈道導(dǎo)彈（IRBM）。發(fā)射地點(diǎn)似乎是卡普斯廷雅爾（Kapustin Yar），距離目標(biāo)大約804.67km。

As for the RS-26, this is a solid-fueled, road-mobile missile that has been described in the past as a smaller derivative of the RS-24 Yars ICBM, although the exact relationship is unclear. Development of the RS-26 began around 2008 by the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology. The missile is reportedly around 39 feet long and has a diameter of just under six feet.

至于RS-26，這是一種固體燃料、可公路機(jī)動(dòng)的導(dǎo)彈，過去曾被描述為RS-24“雅爾斯”洲際彈道導(dǎo)彈（ICBM）的較小改進(jìn)型，盡管兩者之間的具體關(guān)系尚不明確。RS-26的研發(fā)大約始于2008年，由莫斯科熱技術(shù)研究所（Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology）負(fù)責(zé)。該導(dǎo)彈的長(zhǎng)度約為11.89m，直徑略低于1.83m。


A first, unsuccessful test launch occurred at Plesetsk in September 2011.

第一次測(cè)試發(fā)射發(fā)生在2011年9月，地點(diǎn)位于普列謝茨克（Plesetsk），但未成功。

In a second test in May 2012, Russia demonstrated that the RS-26 could reach an intercontinental range, although it was widely assumed that this was only achieved with a light payload or no payload at all.

在2012年5月的第二次測(cè)試中，俄羅斯展示了RS-26能夠達(dá)到洲際射程，盡管普遍認(rèn)為這是在輕型載荷或沒有載荷的情況下實(shí)現(xiàn)的。

Subsequent tests strongly indicated the missile couldn’t fly beyond intermediate ranges with an actual warhead, which would have put it in contravention of the INF had it been fielded operationally prior to 2019.

隨后的測(cè)試強(qiáng)烈表明，這枚導(dǎo)彈在攜帶實(shí)際戰(zhàn)斗部的情況下無(wú)法超過中程射程，如果在2019年前投入使用，將違反《中程核力量條約》（INF）。

Amid this controversy, Russia had officially pulled the plug on the potentially treaty-busting RS-26 in 2018. In March of that year, only weeks after Russian President Vladimir Putin mentioned it in a provocative speech, Russia reportedly decided to shelve the development of the Rubezh, dropping it from the state armament plan for 2018 to 2027. Instead, the country would focus on fielding the nuclear-armed Avangard hypersonic boost-glide vehicle weapon. Previously, Putin had stated that the RS-26 would also serve as the primary launch vehicle for Avangard.

在這場(chǎng)爭(zhēng)議中，俄羅斯在2018年正式停止了可能違反條約的RS-26的研發(fā)。那年3月，就在俄羅斯總統(tǒng)弗拉基米爾·普京在一次具有挑釁性的演講中提到該導(dǎo)彈后不久，俄羅斯 reportedly 決定將“邊界”（Rubezh）的研發(fā)擱置，并將其從2018年至2027年的國(guó)家武器計(jì)劃中刪除。取而代之的是，該國(guó)將重點(diǎn)發(fā)展核武裝的“先鋒”高超音速助推滑行飛行器（Avangard）。此前，普京曾表示，RS-26也將作為“先鋒”系統(tǒng)的主要發(fā)射平臺(tái)。

A Russian Ministry of Defense video reportedly showing Avangard prototypes and a computer-generated depiction of its operational concept.

據(jù)報(bào)道，俄羅斯國(guó)防部發(fā)布的一段視頻展示了“先鋒”系統(tǒng)的原型以及其作戰(zhàn)概念的計(jì)算機(jī)生成圖像。
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“The Avangard was included in the [state armament plan] program’s final version as more essential to ensure the country’s defense capability,” a Russian defense industry source said, according to state-run media outlet TASS. “All the work on the Rubezh and the Barguzin [rail-mobile ICBM] was put on hold until the end of 2027. A decision on the work’s resumption will be made after the current armament program is fulfilled.”

據(jù)國(guó)家通訊社塔斯社（TASS）報(bào)道，一位俄羅斯國(guó)防工業(yè)消息人士表示：“‘先鋒’系統(tǒng)被納入了[國(guó)家武器計(jì)劃]的最終版本，因?yàn)樗鼘?duì)確保國(guó)家防御能力更為關(guān)鍵。所有關(guān)于‘邊界’（Rubezh）導(dǎo)彈和‘巴爾古津’（Barguzin）鐵路機(jī)動(dòng)洲際導(dǎo)彈（ICBM）的工作都被暫停，直到2027年底。是否恢復(fù)這些工作的決定將在當(dāng)前武器計(jì)劃完成后做出?！?/b>

Without the RS-26, the Avangard has instead been fielded in a silo-based form loaded onto repurposed rocket boosters from old UR-100N UTTKh ICBMs. The hypersonic boost-glide vehicle may also become a payload option for the silo-launched RS-28 Sarmat ICBM, which has had a troubled development. There is clear evidence that a new RS-28 test launch earlier ended in disaster.

在RS-26被取消后，“先鋒”系統(tǒng)改為以封閉發(fā)射井的形式部署，搭載重新改造的老UR-100N UTTKh洲際彈道導(dǎo)彈（ICBM）助推器。高超音速助推滑行器也可能成為發(fā)射井發(fā)射的RS-28薩爾馬特（Sarmat）洲際彈道導(dǎo)彈的有效載荷選項(xiàng)，而RS-28薩爾馬特本身的研發(fā)過程經(jīng)歷了許多困難。有明顯證據(jù)表明，最近一次RS-28的測(cè)試發(fā)射以災(zāi)難告終。


It was unclear exactly why Russia abandoned the RS-26, although it may simply have been a financial decision, especially with competition from a range of other advanced strategic capabilities the country is also pursuing. Cost concerns were certainly raised in the TASS reporting in 2018.

俄羅斯為何放棄RS-26的具體原因尚不明確，盡管這可能僅僅是一個(gè)財(cái)務(wù)決策，特別是在該國(guó)還在追求其他一系列先進(jìn)戰(zhàn)略能力的情況下。2018年塔斯社的報(bào)道中，成本問題確實(shí)被提出過。

“It was initially planned to include both the Avangard and the [RS-26] Rubezh in the state armament plan,” the anonymous defense industry source told TASS. “It became clear later that funds would not suffice to finance both systems at a time.”

“最初計(jì)劃將‘先鋒’和[RS-26]‘邊界’都納入國(guó)家武器計(jì)劃，”這位匿名的國(guó)防工業(yè)消息人士告訴塔斯社?！昂髞?lái)顯然資金不足以同時(shí)資助這兩個(gè)系統(tǒng)。”

There may have been other issues, as well. After all, prior to being mentioned again in 2018, there had been scant official mention of the RS-26 at all for years. The Kremlin was supposed to demonstrate the system to arms control inspectors from the United States first in 2015 and then in 2016, but both of these inspections were missed.

可能還有其他問題。畢竟，在2018年再次提到之前，RS-26多年來(lái)幾乎沒有得到官方提及?？死锬妨謱m本應(yīng)在2015年和2016年分別向來(lái)自美國(guó)的軍控檢查員展示該系統(tǒng)，但這兩次檢查都未能按計(jì)劃進(jìn)行。

However, in a 2021 report, the Pentagon stated that, despite the reports in the Russian press, work on the RS-26 and testing of associated equipment continued at least into 2018.

然而，在2021年的一份報(bào)告中，五角大樓表示，盡管俄羅斯媒體有相關(guān)報(bào)道，RS-26的研發(fā)工作和相關(guān)設(shè)備的測(cè)試至少持續(xù)到了2018年。

With the demise of INF and the deepening tensions between Russia and NATO, it could be that Moscow has revisited the RS-26, perhaps in the form of the Oreshnik, although there is no evidence that either missile has so far been operationally deployed.

隨著《中程核力量條約》的終結(jié)以及俄羅斯與北約之間緊張局勢(shì)的加劇，莫斯科可能已經(jīng)重新審視了RS-26，或許以“奧列什尼克導(dǎo)彈”的形式出現(xiàn)，盡管目前沒有證據(jù)表明這兩種導(dǎo)彈已投入實(shí)際部署。

Asked for his reflections on the Dnipro strike, and prior to the Oreshnik disclosure, Pavel Podvig, a senior researcher in the WMD Program at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), told TWZ that the missile used could have been an RS-26 — employed on an experimental basis — or perhaps some new type of missile in the same class. If that were the case, the new missile, Oreshnik or otherwise, would likely be very similar to the RS-26, according to Podvig’s assessment.

在被問及對(duì)第聶伯（Dnipro）襲擊的看法時(shí)，在“奧列什尼克導(dǎo)彈”披露之前，聯(lián)合國(guó)裁軍研究所（UNIDIR）大規(guī)模殺傷性武器項(xiàng)目的高級(jí)研究員帕維爾·波德維格（Pavel Podvig）告訴《TWZ》，此次使用的導(dǎo)彈可能是RS-26——以實(shí)驗(yàn)性方式使用——或者可能是同一類別的某種新型導(dǎo)彈。根據(jù)波德維格的評(píng)估，如果是這種情況，這種新導(dǎo)彈，無(wú)論是“奧列什尼克導(dǎo)彈”還是其他名稱，都可能與RS-26非常相似。

As to the likelihood of Russia having returned to developing IRBMs, more generally, Podvig says it’s “entirely possible” that Russia might have revived the RS-26 program. “I wouldn’t be surprised if there was some effort to create a missile that would be kind of similar to RS-26, or SS-20 and things like that. I would not be surprised if design bureaus started putting together a project of that kind,” he added.

關(guān)于俄羅斯是否重新開始研發(fā)中程彈道導(dǎo)彈（IRBM）的問題，波德維格表示，“完全有可能”俄羅斯重新啟動(dòng)了RS-26項(xiàng)目。他補(bǔ)充道:“如果有一些努力去研發(fā)類似于RS-26、SS-20之類的導(dǎo)彈，我不會(huì)感到驚訝。如果設(shè)計(jì)局開始著手進(jìn)行這種類型的項(xiàng)目，我也不會(huì)感到意外?！?。

There is also the possibility that, if a version of the RS-26 was used, this was simply a case of using up one of the non-operational or even prototype rounds in a combat mission, albeit now rebranded as Oreshnik. The combination of range to target (roughly 500 miles), the ability to evade Ukrainian air defenses, and the powerful signaling may simply have been too tempting for Russia.

還有一種可能性是，如果使用了RS-26的某個(gè)版本，這只是將一個(gè)非作戰(zhàn)狀態(tài)或甚至是原型彈用于實(shí)際作戰(zhàn)任務(wù)的情況，盡管現(xiàn)在可能被重新命名為“奧列什尼克導(dǎo)彈”?？紤]到射程（大約500英里）、規(guī)避烏克蘭防空能力的能力，以及強(qiáng)烈的信號(hào)傳遞，這可能對(duì)俄羅斯來(lái)說是一個(gè)過于誘人的選擇。
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At the same time, using an IRBM of any kind for an operational strike will also provide Russia with very valuable information. After all, no ICBM or IRBM has ever been used in combat before.

同時(shí)，使用任何類型的中程彈道導(dǎo)彈（IRBM）進(jìn)行實(shí)戰(zhàn)打擊，也將為俄羅斯提供非常寶貴的信息。畢竟，迄今為止，洲際彈道導(dǎo)彈（ICBM）和中程彈道導(dǎo)彈（IRBM）從未在實(shí)戰(zhàn)中使用過。

While the precise identity of the missile used remains a mystery for now, it’s also unclear what kind of payload it was carrying.

盡管目前使用的導(dǎo)彈的確切身份仍然是個(gè)謎，但它所攜帶的彈頭類型也尚不清楚。
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When it was developed, the RS-26 was expected to carry either a single nuclear warhead or a nuclear multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) payload — both options were tested in 2013. The Avangard was, for a while, also seen as an RS-26 payload. Clearly, the missile that targeted Dnipro was either conventionally armed or perhaps, unarmed.

在RS-26開發(fā)時(shí)，它預(yù)計(jì)將攜帶單一核彈頭或核多彈頭獨(dú)立再入飛行器（MIRV）彈頭——這兩種選項(xiàng)在2013年都進(jìn)行了測(cè)試。曾一度認(rèn)為，Avangard也可以作為RS-26的彈頭。顯然，襲擊第聶伯的導(dǎo)彈要么是常規(guī)彈頭，要么可能是未裝載彈頭。

Videos of the strike show what appears to be six warheads hurtling toward the ground, consistent with MIRVs.

襲擊的視頻顯示，似乎有六個(gè)彈頭正快速下墜，這與多彈頭獨(dú)立再入飛行器（MIRV）的特征一致。

Podvig told us that an unarmed RS-26 (or similar IRBM) is “not entirely impossible,” but also raised the possibility of the missile being fitted with small explosive warheads. There is also the potential that the missile was carrying decoys or a combination of small conventional warheads and decoys.

波德維格告訴我們，未裝載彈頭的RS-26（或類似的中程彈道導(dǎo)彈）“并非完全不可能”，但他也提出了導(dǎo)彈可能裝配小型爆炸性彈頭的可能性。此外，導(dǎo)彈可能攜帶的是誘餌，或者是小型常規(guī)彈頭和誘餌的組合。
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A conventionally armed IRBM is an interesting proposition and it’s not clear if this would have been developed specifically for this strike, or for use in Ukraine more generally, or if it might reflect a broader interest in Russia to field conventional versions of its strategic missiles.

常規(guī)彈頭的中程彈道導(dǎo)彈（IRBM）是一個(gè)有趣的提議，目前尚不清楚這是否是專門為此次打擊而開發(fā)，還是為了更廣泛地在烏克蘭使用，抑或是反映了俄羅斯有意部署其戰(zhàn)略導(dǎo)彈的常規(guī)版本。

Russia is not known to have looked at developing conventionally armed IRBMs/ICBMs, although, in the past, TWZ has looked at the potential arguments for doing just that — albeit in the case of Israel.

俄羅斯并不以開發(fā)常規(guī)彈頭的中程或洲際彈道導(dǎo)彈（IRBM/ICBM）聞名，盡管在過去，TWZ曾探討過開發(fā)常規(guī)彈頭導(dǎo)彈的潛在理由——盡管那是以色列的情況。

Amid a worsening crisis involving Iran, we examined the possibility of Israel launching an attack using a conventionally armed version of its Jericho IRBM — best known as a launch vehicle for the Israeli nuclear deterrent.

在涉及伊朗的危機(jī)加劇之際，我們探討了以色列使用常規(guī)彈頭版本的杰里科中程彈道導(dǎo)彈（Jericho IRBM）發(fā)動(dòng)攻擊的可能性——該導(dǎo)彈最著名的是作為以色列核威懾的發(fā)射平臺(tái)。

The same arguments could apply to Russia, which might want to make an extremely powerful show of force in the hope of signaling to the West that it should not become more deeply involved in the war in Ukraine. This is especially true for deterring the U.S. and its partners from allowing expanded targeting for its donated weapons inside of Russian borders.

同樣的理由也適用于俄羅斯，俄羅斯可能希望通過展示極為強(qiáng)大的力量，向西方發(fā)出信號(hào)，表明不應(yīng)進(jìn)一步深入介入烏克蘭戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)。特別是在威懾美國(guó)及其伙伴國(guó)方面，防止它們?cè)试S擴(kuò)展對(duì)俄羅斯邊境內(nèi)目標(biāo)的攻擊范圍。

Tellingly, soon after the United States and other allies last week allowed Ukraine to launch long-range missiles into Russia, officials in Moscow warned that they might use a weapon never previously employed on Ukrainian territory.

值得注意的是，在上周美國(guó)及其他盟國(guó)允許烏克蘭向俄羅斯境內(nèi)發(fā)射遠(yuǎn)程導(dǎo)彈后不久，莫斯科官員警告稱，他們可能會(huì)使用一種此前從未在烏克蘭領(lǐng)土上使用過的武器。

Using a conventionally armed IRBM may well be a response to that decision by the relevant Western powers. Not only is such a missile immune to Ukrainian air defenses but it also delivers a very robust message and one that will resonate across Europe. After all, this is a missile that can reach targets anywhere in the continent and which, on another day, could be topped with a nuclear warhead.

使用常規(guī)彈頭的中程彈道導(dǎo)彈（IRBM）很可能是對(duì)相關(guān)西方國(guó)家這一決定的回應(yīng)。這種導(dǎo)彈不僅能免疫烏克蘭的防空系統(tǒng)，還傳遞了一個(gè)極具威懾力的信息，并且這一信息將在整個(gè)歐洲引起共鳴。畢竟，這是一種能夠打擊歐洲任何目標(biāo)的導(dǎo)彈，而在另一天，它也可能攜帶核彈頭。

If the missile was indeed filled with decoys and perhaps didn’t even carry highly-destructive conventional warheads, that would very much point to signaling being the desired effect.

如果該導(dǎo)彈確實(shí)攜帶了誘餌彈，甚至沒有搭載高破壞性的常規(guī)彈頭，這將非常明確地表明，其目的在于傳遞信號(hào)。

On the other hand, a high-explosive warhead would be extremely destructive and might well be sexted for a particularly important or heavily defended target. Should Russia want to target hardened or buried command centers and other key fortified sites in Ukraine, then it might call upon the same types of missiles again — provided they are available in sufficient numbers.

另一方面，高爆彈頭具有極強(qiáng)的破壞力，可能會(huì)被用于打擊特別重要或防御嚴(yán)密的目標(biāo)。如果俄羅斯希望攻擊烏克蘭的加固或地下指揮中心以及其他關(guān)鍵的防御工事，那么可能會(huì)再次使用同類型導(dǎo)彈——前提是這些導(dǎo)彈的數(shù)量足夠。

Even demonstrating such a capability is significant, since Ukraine’s air defenses mean that Russia could use such missiles to strike anywhere in the country with impunity. Again, if a conventional warhead can be used in this way, the implications of using a nuclear warhead become obvious.

即便僅是展示這種能力也具有重要意義，因?yàn)闉蹩颂m的防空系統(tǒng)意味著俄羅斯可以毫無(wú)阻礙地使用此類導(dǎo)彈打擊烏克蘭境內(nèi)的任何目標(biāo)。同樣，如果能夠以這種方式使用常規(guī)彈頭，其轉(zhuǎn)而使用核彈頭的潛在影響也顯而易見。

Russian war planners would have to weigh all this up against the possibility that Ukraine and NATO might misconstrue an incoming conventionally armed IRBM as a nuclear one. However, it should be recalled that all of the ballistic and cruise missiles launched against Ukraine so far by Russia also have the capability to carry nuclear payloads. As we suspected, it is now widely understood that Russia warned the U.S. of its intended strike by a conventionally armed strategic weapon prior to launch.

俄羅斯的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)規(guī)劃者必須權(quán)衡這一點(diǎn)，即烏克蘭和北約可能會(huì)誤認(rèn)為來(lái)襲的常規(guī)彈頭中程彈道導(dǎo)彈（IRBM）是核導(dǎo)彈的可能性。然而，需要記住的是，到目前為止，俄羅斯對(duì)烏克蘭發(fā)射的所有彈道導(dǎo)彈和巡航導(dǎo)彈都具有攜帶核彈頭的能力。正如所料，人們現(xiàn)在普遍認(rèn)為，俄羅斯在發(fā)射常規(guī)武裝戰(zhàn)略武器之前，曾向美國(guó)發(fā)出過相關(guān)警告。

Ultimately, we will need to wait for more evidence to determine the relationship between the RS-26 and the Oreshnik.

最終，我們需要等待更多的證據(jù)來(lái)確定RS-26與奧列什尼克導(dǎo)彈之間的關(guān)系。

It seems certain, however, that Russia has launched an unprecedented attack — and one that does not have a historical parallel.

然而，可以肯定的是，俄羅斯發(fā)動(dòng)了一次前所未有的攻擊，這種行為在歷史上沒有先例可循。