‘There was no “zero-error” policy’
B., a senior officer who used Lavender, echoed to +972 and Local Call that in the current war, officers were not required to independently review the AI system’s assessments, in order to save time and enable the mass production of human targets without hindrances.

“沒有‘零錯誤’政策”
使用薰衣草的高級軍官 B. 向媒體表示，在當(dāng)前戰(zhàn)爭中，軍官們不需要獨立審查人工智能系統(tǒng)的評估，以節(jié)省時間并能夠順利地大規(guī)模生產(chǎn)人體目標(biāo)。

“Everything was statistical, everything was neat — it was very dry,” B. said. He noted that this lack of supervision was permitted despite internal checks showing that Lavender’s calculations were considered accurate only 90 percent of the time; in other words, it was known in advance that 10 percent of the human targets slated for assassination were not members of the Hamas military wing at all.

“一切都是統(tǒng)計數(shù)字，一切都井井有條——非常干巴巴的，”B. 說。他指出，盡管內(nèi)部檢查顯示薰衣草的計算準(zhǔn)確率只有 90%；換句話說，事先就知道 10% 的暗殺目標(biāo)根本不是哈馬斯軍事部門的成員，但這種缺乏監(jiān)督的做法是允許的。

For example, sources explained that the Lavender machine sometimes mistakenly flagged individuals who had communication patterns similar to known Hamas or PIJ operatives — including police and civil defense workers, militants’ relatives, residents who happened to have a name and nickname identical to that of an operative, and Gazans who used a device that once belonged to a Hamas operative.

例如，消息人士解釋道，“薰衣草”機器有時會錯誤地標(biāo)記出那些與已知哈馬斯或巴基斯坦伊斯蘭圣戰(zhàn)組織成員有著相似溝通模式的個人，其中包括警察和民防工作人員、武裝分子的親屬、姓名和昵稱恰巧與成員相同的居民，以及使用曾屬于哈馬斯成員的設(shè)備的加沙人。

“How close does a person have to be to Hamas to be [considered by an AI machine to be] affiliated with the organization?” said one source critical of Lavender’s inaccuracy. “It’s a vague boundary. Is a person who doesn’t receive a salary from Hamas, but helps them with all sorts of things, a Hamas operative? Is someone who was in Hamas in the past, but is no longer there today, a Hamas operative? Each of these features — characteristics that a machine would flag as suspicious — is inaccurate.”

“一個人要和哈馬斯有多親密，才能被人工智能認為是該組織的附屬機構(gòu)？”一位批評薰衣草說法不準(zhǔn)確的消息人士說道?！斑@是一個模糊的界限。一個不從哈馬斯領(lǐng)取薪水，卻在各種事情上幫助他們的人，是哈馬斯特工嗎？“如果一個人曾經(jīng)在哈馬斯工作，但現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)不在那里了，那么他就是哈馬斯特工嗎？這些特征——機器會標(biāo)記為可疑的特征——都是不準(zhǔn)確的?！?/b>

Similar problems exist with the ability of target machines to assess the phone used by an individual marked for assassination. “In war, Palestinians change phones all the time,” said the source. “People lose contact with their families, give their phone to a friend or a wife, maybe lose it. There is no way to rely 100 percent on the automatic mechanism that determines which [phone] number belongs to whom.”

目標(biāo)機器對被暗殺者所用手機的識別能力也存在類似問題。消息人士稱：“在戰(zhàn)爭中，巴勒斯坦人經(jīng)常更換手機?！薄叭藗兣c家人失去聯(lián)系，將手機交給朋友或妻子，甚至可能丟失。沒有辦法 100% 依賴自動機制來確定哪個 [電話] 號碼屬于誰。”

According to the sources, the army knew that the minimal human supervision in place would not discover these faults. “There was no ‘zero-error’ policy. Mistakes were treated statistically,” said a source who used Lavender. “Because of the scope and magnitude, the protocol was that even if you don’t know for sure that the machine is right, you know that statistically it’s fine. So you go for it.”

據(jù)消息人士稱，軍方知道，最低限度的人工監(jiān)督無法發(fā)現(xiàn)這些錯誤?！皼]有‘零錯誤’政策。錯誤被統(tǒng)計處理，”一位使用 薰衣草的消息人士說?！坝捎诜秶鸵?guī)模，協(xié)議規(guī)定，即使你不確定機器是否正確，你也知道從統(tǒng)計上看它是沒問題的。所以你還是去做吧?！?/b>

“It has proven itself,” said B., the senior source. “There’s something about the statistical approach that sets you to a certain norm and standard. There has been an illogical amount of [bombings] in this operation. This is unparalleled, in my memory. And I have much more trust in a statistical mechanism than a soldier who lost a friend two days ago. Everyone there, including me, lost people on October 7. The machine did it coldly. And that made it easier.”

“事實已經(jīng)證明了這一點，”資深消息人士 B 說?！敖y(tǒng)計方法會給你設(shè)定一定的規(guī)范和標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。這次行動中發(fā)生的 [爆炸] 次數(shù)多得不合邏輯。在我的記憶中，這是前所未有的。我對統(tǒng)計機制的信任程度遠高于兩天前失去戰(zhàn)友的士兵。包括我在內(nèi)，那里的每個人都在 10 月 7 日失去了親人。機器冷靜地處理了這一切。這讓一切變得更容易?！?/b>

Another intelligence source, who defended the reliance on the Lavender-generated kill lists of Palestinian suspects, argued that it was worth investing an intelligence officer’s time only to verify the information if the target was a senior commander in Hamas. “But when it comes to a junior militant, you don’t want to invest manpower and time in it,” he said. “In war, there is no time to incriminate every target. So you’re willing to take the margin of error of using artificial intelligence, risking collateral damage and civilians dying, and risking attacking by mistake, and to live with it.”

另一位情報人士為依賴薰衣草生成的巴勒斯坦嫌疑人暗殺名單進行辯護，他認為，只有當(dāng)目標(biāo)是哈馬斯的高級指揮官時，才值得情報人員花時間來核實信息?！暗?dāng)涉及到初級武裝分子時，你不想投入人力和時間，”他說。“在戰(zhàn)爭中，沒有時間去指控每一個目標(biāo)。所以你愿意冒著使用人工智能的誤差幅度，冒著附帶損害和平民死亡的風(fēng)險，冒著誤擊的風(fēng)險，并接受它。”
原創(chuàng)翻譯：龍騰網(wǎng) http://nxnpts.cn 轉(zhuǎn)載請注明出處


B. said that the reason for this automation was a constant push to generate more targets for assassination. “In a day without targets [whose feature rating was sufficient to authorize a strike], we attacked at a lower threshold. We were constantly being pressured: ‘Bring us more targets.’ They really shouted at us. We finished [killing] our targets very quickly.”

B. 表示，這種自動化的原因是為了不斷產(chǎn)生更多暗殺目標(biāo)?！霸跊]有目標(biāo)（其特征評級足以授權(quán)打擊）的一天里，我們以較低的門檻發(fā)動攻擊。我們不斷受到壓力：‘給我們帶來更多目標(biāo)?！麄冋娴膶ξ覀兇蠛按蠼小Ｎ覀兒芸炀屯瓿闪耍⑺溃┠繕?biāo)?！?/b>

He explained that when lowering the rating threshold of Lavender, it would mark more people as targets for strikes. “At its peak, the system managed to generate 37,000 people as potential human targets,” said B. “But the numbers changed all the time, because it depends on where you set the bar of what a Hamas operative is. There were times when a Hamas operative was defined more broadly, and then the machine started bringing us all kinds of civil defense personnel, police officers, on whom it would be a shame to waste bombs. They help the Hamas government, but they don’t really endanger soldiers.”

他解釋說，降低薰衣草的評級門檻，會將更多人標(biāo)記為打擊目標(biāo)?！霸趲p峰時期，該系統(tǒng)成功生成了 37000 人作為潛在人體目標(biāo)，”B 說。“但數(shù)字一直在變化，因為這取決于你對哈馬斯行動人員的設(shè)定標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。曾經(jīng)有一段時間，哈馬斯特工的定義更為寬泛，然后機器開始給我們帶來各種民防人員、警察，在他們身上浪費炸彈是一種恥辱。他們幫助哈馬斯政府，但實際上不會危及士兵?！?/b>
原創(chuàng)翻譯：龍騰網(wǎng) http://nxnpts.cn 轉(zhuǎn)載請注明出處


One source who worked with the military data science team that trained Lavender said that data collected from employees of the Hamas-run Internal Security Ministry, whom he does not consider to be militants, was also fed into the machine. “I was bothered by the fact that when Lavender was trained, they used the term ‘Hamas operative’ loosely, and included people who were civil defense workers in the training dataset,” he said.

一位曾與培訓(xùn)薰衣草的軍事數(shù)據(jù)科學(xué)團隊合作過的消息人士表示，從哈馬斯控制的內(nèi)政部雇員那里收集的數(shù)據(jù)也被輸入了這臺機器，但他不認為這些雇員是武裝分子。他說：“我對這樣的事實感到困擾：在對薰衣草進行培訓(xùn)時，他們隨意使用了‘哈馬斯特工’一詞，并在培訓(xùn)數(shù)據(jù)集中包括了民防工作者?！?/b>

The source added that even if one believes these people deserve to be killed, training the system based on their communication profiles made Lavender more likely to sext civilians by mistake when its algorithms were applied to the general population. “Since it’s an automatic system that isn’t operated manually by humans, the meaning of this decision is dramatic: it means you’re including many people with a civilian communication profile as potential targets.”

消息人士補充說，即使有人認為這些人應(yīng)該被殺，但根據(jù)他們的溝通資料對系統(tǒng)進行訓(xùn)練，使得薰衣草在將其算法應(yīng)用于普通人群時更有可能錯誤地選擇平民?！坝捎谶@是一個無需人工操作的自動系統(tǒng)，因此這一決定的意義重大：這意味著你將許多具有平民通信資料的人列為潛在目標(biāo)?！?/b>

‘We only checked that the target was a man’
The Israeli military flatly rejects these claims. In a statement to +972 and Local Call, the IDF Spokesperson denied using artificial intelligence to incriminate targets, saying these are merely “auxiliary tools that assist officers in the process of incrimination.” The statement went on: “In any case, an independent examination by an [intelligence] analyst is required, which verifies that the identified targets are legitimate targets for attack, in accordance with the conditions set forth in IDF directives and international law.”

“我們只確認目標(biāo)是一名男性”
以色列軍方斷然否認了這些說法。以色列國防軍發(fā)言人在向 當(dāng)?shù)孛襟w發(fā)表的聲明中否認使用人工智能來定罪目標(biāo)，稱這些只是“協(xié)助警官定罪的輔助工具”。聲明繼續(xù)說道：“無論如何，都需要由情報分析員進行獨立審查，以驗證所確定的目標(biāo)是否為合法的攻擊目標(biāo)，符合以色列國防軍指令和國際法規(guī)定的條件?！?/b>

However, sources said that the only human supervision protocol in place before bombing the houses of suspected “junior” militants marked by Lavender was to conduct a single check: ensuring that the AI-sexted target is male rather than female. The assumption in the army was that if the target was a woman, the machine had likely made a mistake, because there are no women among the ranks of the military wings of Hamas and PIJ.

不過，消息人士稱，在轟炸被“薰衣草”標(biāo)記的疑似“初級”武裝分子的房屋之前，唯一的人工監(jiān)督協(xié)議是進行一項檢查：確保人工智能選擇的目標(biāo)是男性而不是女性。軍隊的假設(shè)是，如果目標(biāo)是一名女性，那么機器很可能犯了一個錯誤，因為哈馬斯和巴基斯坦伊斯蘭圣戰(zhàn)者組織的軍事部門中沒有女性。

“A human being had to [verify the target] for just a few seconds,” B. said, explaining that this became the protocol after realizing the Lavender system was “getting it right” most of the time. “At first, we did checks to ensure that the machine didn’t get confused. But at some point we relied on the automatic system, and we only checked that [the target] was a man — that was enough. It doesn’t take a long time to tell if someone has a male or a female voice.”

“人類只需花幾秒鐘 [確認目標(biāo)]，”B. 說道，他解釋說，在意識到薰衣草系統(tǒng)大多數(shù)時候都“正確無誤”后，這成為了慣例?！捌鸪酰覀冞M行了檢查，以確保機器不會混淆。但有時我們會依賴自動系統(tǒng)，我們只檢查 [目標(biāo)] 是男性 — — 這就足夠了。不需要很長時間就能分辨出某人的聲音是男性還是女性。”

To conduct the male/female check, B. claimed that in the current war, “I would invest 20 seconds for each target at this stage, and do dozens of them every day. I had zero added value as a human, apart from being a stamp of approval. It saved a lot of time. If [the operative] came up in the automated mechanism, and I checked that he was a man, there would be permission to bomb him, subject to an examination of collateral damage.”

為了進行男女檢查，B. 聲稱在目前的戰(zhàn)爭中，“在這個階段，我會為每個目標(biāo)投入 20 秒，每天做幾十次。除了作為批準(zhǔn)標(biāo)志之外，我作為人類沒有任何附加價值。這節(jié)省了很多時間。如果 [特工] 出現(xiàn)在自動裝置中，我檢查出他是男性，就會允許轟炸他，但要經(jīng)過附帶損害檢查?！?/b>

In practice, sources said this meant that for civilian men marked in error by Lavender, there was no supervising mechanism in place to detect the mistake. According to B., a common error occurred “if the [Hamas] target gave [his phone] to his son, his older brother, or just a random man. That person will be bombed in his house with his family. This happened often. These were most of the mistakes caused by Lavender,” B. said.

實際上，消息人士稱，這意味著對于被薰衣草錯誤標(biāo)記的平民，沒有監(jiān)督機制來發(fā)現(xiàn)錯誤。據(jù) B. 稱，一個常見的錯誤是“如果 [哈馬斯] 目標(biāo)將 [他的手機] 交給他的兒子、哥哥或隨便一個男人。這個人將和家人一起在家中被炸。這種情況經(jīng)常發(fā)生。這些是薰衣草造成的大多數(shù)錯誤，”B. 說。

STEP 2: lixiNG TARGETS TO FAMILY HOMES
‘Most of the people you killed were women and children’
The next stage in the Israeli army’s assassination procedure is identifying where to attack the targets that Lavender generates.

第 2 步：將目標(biāo)與家庭住所聯(lián)系起來
“你們殺害的大多數(shù)人都是婦女和兒童”
以色列軍隊暗殺程序的下一個階段是確定在哪里攻擊“薰衣草”生成的目標(biāo)。

In a statement to +972 and Local Call, the IDF Spokesperson claimed in response to this article that “Hamas places its operatives and military assets in the heart of the civilian population, systematically uses the civilian population as human shields, and conducts fighting from within civilian structures, including sensitive sites such as hospitals, mosques, schools and UN facilities. The IDF is bound by and acts according to international law, directing its attacks only at military targets and military operatives.”

以色列國防軍發(fā)言人在向當(dāng)?shù)孛襟w發(fā)表的聲明中回應(yīng)了這篇文章，聲稱“哈馬斯將其人員和軍事資產(chǎn)安置在平民區(qū)中心，系統(tǒng)地使用平民作為人盾，并在平民建筑內(nèi)進行戰(zhàn)斗，包括醫(yī)院、清真寺、學(xué)校和聯(lián)合國設(shè)施等敏感地點。以色列國防軍受國際法約束并依據(jù)國際法行事，其攻擊對象只是軍事目標(biāo)和軍事人員?！?/b>

The six sources we spoke to echoed this to some degree, saying that Hamas’ extensive tunnel system deliberately passes under hospitals and schools; that Hamas militants use ambulances to get around; and that countless military assets have been situated near civilian buildings. The sources argued that many Israeli strikes kill civilians as a result of these tactics by Hamas — a characterization that human rights groups warn evades Israel’s onus for inflicting the casualties.

我們采訪的六個消息來源在某種程度上也表達了同樣的意見，他們表示，哈馬斯龐大的隧道系統(tǒng)故意從醫(yī)院和學(xué)校地下穿過；哈馬斯武裝分子使用救護車出行；無數(shù)軍事資產(chǎn)被安置在平民建筑附近。消息人士稱，由于哈馬斯的這些策略，以色列的許多襲擊都造成平民死亡。人權(quán)組織警告說，這種說法逃避了以色列對造成人員傷亡的責(zé)任。

However, in contrast to the Israeli army’s official statements, the sources explained that a major reason for the unprecedented death toll from Israel’s current bombardment is the fact that the army has systematically attacked targets in their private homes, alongside their families — in part because it was easier from an intelligence standpoint to mark family houses using automated systems.

然而，與以色列軍隊的官方聲明相反，消息人士解釋說，以色列此次轟炸造成前所未有的死亡人數(shù)的一個主要原因是，以色列軍隊系統(tǒng)地襲擊目標(biāo)的私人住宅，包括他們的家人——部分原因是從情報角度來看，使用自動化系統(tǒng)標(biāo)記家庭住宅更容易。

Indeed, several sources emphasized that, as opposed to numerous cases of Hamas operatives engaging in military activity from civilian areas, in the case of systematic assassination strikes, the army routinely made the active choice to bomb suspected militants when inside civilian households from which no military activity took place. This choice, they said, was a reflection of the way Israel’s system of mass surveillance in Gaza is designed.

事實上，多個消息來源強調(diào)指出，與哈馬斯分子多次在平民區(qū)從事軍事活動的情況不同，在系統(tǒng)性暗殺襲擊的情況下，軍隊經(jīng)常主動選擇在沒有發(fā)生軍事活動的平民家中轟炸嫌疑分子。他們表示，這一選擇反映了以色列在加沙實施大規(guī)模監(jiān)視系統(tǒng)的方式。
原創(chuàng)翻譯：龍騰網(wǎng) http://nxnpts.cn 轉(zhuǎn)載請注明出處


The sources told +972 and Local Call that since everyone in Gaza had a private house with which they could be associated, the army’s surveillance systems could easily and automatically “l(fā)ix” individuals to family houses. In order to identify the moment operatives enter their houses in real time, various additional automatic softwares have been developed. These programs track thousands of individuals simultaneously, identify when they are at home, and send an automatic alx to the targeting officer, who then marks the house for bombing. One of several of these tracking softwares, revealed here for the first time, is called “Where’s Daddy?”

消息人士告訴 當(dāng)?shù)孛襟w，由于加沙每個人都擁有一所可以聯(lián)系到的私人住宅，因此軍隊的監(jiān)視系統(tǒng)可以輕松自動地將個人與家庭住宅“聯(lián)系起來”。為了實時識別特工進入房屋的時間，已經(jīng)開發(fā)了各種額外的自動軟件。這些程序可以同時跟蹤數(shù)千人，識別他們何時在家，并向目標(biāo)警官發(fā)送自動警報，然后目標(biāo)警官會標(biāo)記房屋以進行轟炸。其中一種跟蹤軟件首次公開，名為“爸爸在哪里？”

“You put hundreds [of targets] into the system and wait to see who you can kill,” said one source with knowledge of the system. “It’s called broad hunting: you copy-paste from the lists that the target system produces.”

一位了解該系統(tǒng)的消息人士表示：“你把數(shù)百個目標(biāo)放入系統(tǒng)，然后等著看誰能被殺。這叫做廣泛追捕：你從目標(biāo)系統(tǒng)生成的列表中復(fù)制粘貼?！?/b>

Evidence of this policy is also clear from the data: during the first month of the war, more than half of the fatalities — 6,120 people — belonged to 1,340 families, many of which were completely wiped out while inside their homes, according to UN figures. The proportion of entire families bombed in their houses in the current war is much higher than in the 2014 Israeli operation in Gaza (which was previously Israel’s deadliest war on the Strip), further suggesting the prominence of this policy.

數(shù)據(jù)也清楚地證明了這一政策：根據(jù)聯(lián)合國的數(shù)據(jù)，在戰(zhàn)爭的第一個月，超過一半的死亡人數(shù)（6120人）來自1340個家庭，其中許多家庭是在家中被徹底消滅的。在當(dāng)前戰(zhàn)爭中，整個家庭在家中遭到轟炸的比例遠遠高于2014年以色列在加沙的行動（這是此前以色列在加沙地帶最致命的戰(zhàn)爭），進一步表明了這一政策的重要性。

Another source said that each time the pace of assassinations waned, more targets were added to systems like Where’s Daddy? to locate individuals that entered their homes and could therefore be bombed. He said that the decision of who to put into the tracking systems could be made by relatively low-ranking officers in the military hierarchy.

另一名消息人士稱，每次暗殺速度減緩，就會有更多目標(biāo)被添加到“爸爸在哪里？”等系統(tǒng)中，以定位進入家中并可能被轟炸的個人。他說，將誰放入追蹤系統(tǒng)的決定可以由軍方級別相對較低的軍官做出。

“One day, totally of my own accord, I added something like 1,200 new targets to the [tracking] system, because the number of attacks [we were conducting] decreased,” the source said. “That made sense to me. In retrospect, it seems like a serious decision I made. And such decisions were not made at high levels.”

“有一天，我完全自愿地在 [跟蹤] 系統(tǒng)中添加了大約 1200 個新目標(biāo)，因為 [我們進行的] 攻擊次數(shù)減少了，”消息人士說?！斑@對我來說很有意義?；叵肫饋?，這似乎是我做出的一個嚴(yán)肅的決定。而且這樣的決定不是由高層做出的?！?/b>

The sources said that in the first two weeks of the war, “several thousand” targets were initially inputted into locating programs like Where’s Daddy?. These included all the members of Hamas’ elite special forces unit the Nukhba, all of Hamas’ anti-tank operatives, and anyone who entered Israel on October 7. But before long, the kill list was drastically expanded.

消息人士稱，在戰(zhàn)爭開始后的前兩周，有“數(shù)千名”目標(biāo)被輸入到類似“爸爸在哪里？”這樣的定位程序中。其中包括哈馬斯精銳特種部隊 Nukhba 的所有成員、哈馬斯的所有反坦克人員以及 10 月 7 日進入以色列的任何人。但不久之后，殺戮名單就大幅擴大了。

“In the end it was everyone [marked by Lavender],” one source explained. “Tens of thousands. This happened a few weeks later, when the [Israeli] brigades entered Gaza, and there were already fewer uninvolved people [i.e. civilians] in the northern areas.” According to this source, even some minors were marked by Lavender as targets for bombing. “Normally, operatives are over the age of 17, but that was not a condition.”

“最后，所有人都被‘薰衣草’標(biāo)記了，”一位消息人士解釋道。“有數(shù)萬人。幾周后，當(dāng)以色列軍隊進入加沙時，北部地區(qū)的無關(guān)人員（即平民）已經(jīng)很少了?！睋?jù)該消息人士透露，薰衣草甚至將一些未成年人列為轟炸目標(biāo)?！巴ǔＧ闆r下，行動人員年齡都在 17 歲以上，但這并不是一個條件?！?/b>

Lavender and systems like Where’s Daddy? were thus combined with deadly effect, killing entire families, sources said. By adding a name from the Lavender-generated lists to the Where’s Daddy? home tracking system, A. explained, the marked person would be placed under ongoing surveillance, and could be attacked as soon as they set foot in their home, collapsing the house on everyone inside.

消息人士稱，薰衣草和“爸爸在哪里？”等系統(tǒng)結(jié)合在一起，產(chǎn)生了致命的效果，導(dǎo)致整個家庭喪命。通過將薰衣草生成的列表中的姓名添加到“爸爸在哪里？”A. 解釋說，有了家庭跟蹤系統(tǒng)，被標(biāo)記的人將受到持續(xù)監(jiān)視，并且一旦他們踏入家門就可能受到攻擊，導(dǎo)致房子倒塌，壓垮家里的所有人。

“Let’s say you calculate [that there is one] Hamas [operative] plus 10 [civilians in the house],” A. said. “Usually, these 10 will be women and children. So absurdly, it turns out that most of the people you killed were women and children.”

“假設(shè)你計算出 [ 有一名 ] 哈馬斯 [ 特工 ] 加上 10 名 [ 房子里的平民 ]，” A. 說?！巴ǔ＃@ 10 人都是婦女和兒童?；闹嚨氖牵聦嵶C明你殺死的大多數(shù)人都是婦女和兒童。”

STEP 3: CHOOSING A WEAPON
‘We usually carried out the attacks with “dumb bombs”’
Once Lavender has marked a target for assassination, army personnel have verified that they are male, and tracking software has located the target in their home, the next stage is picking the munition with which to bomb them.

步驟 3：選擇武器
“我們通常使用‘啞彈’進行襲擊?！?br /> 一旦薰衣草標(biāo)記了暗殺目標(biāo)，軍方人員確認他們是男性，并且跟蹤軟件已將目標(biāo)定位在家中，下一步就是選擇用來轟炸他們的彈藥。

In December 2023, CNN reported that according to U.S. intelligence estimates, about 45 percent of the munitions used by the Israeli air force in Gaza were “dumb” bombs, which are known to cause more collateral damage than guided bombs. In response to the CNN report, an army spokesperson quoted in the article said: “As a military committed to international law and a moral code of conduct, we are devoting vast resources to minimizing harm to the civilians that Hamas has forced into the role of human shields. Our war is against Hamas, not against the people of Gaza.”

2023年12月，美國有線電視新聞網(wǎng)（CNN）報道稱，根據(jù)美國情報部門的估計，以色列空軍在加沙使用的彈藥中約有45%是“啞彈”，眾所周知，這種炸彈比制導(dǎo)炸彈造成的附帶傷害更大。針對 CNN 的報道，文章中引用了一位軍方發(fā)言人的話：“作為一支恪守國際法和道德行為準(zhǔn)則的軍隊，我們正投入大量資源，盡量減少被哈馬斯強行充當(dāng)人盾的平民所受的傷害。我們的戰(zhàn)爭是針對哈馬斯，而不是針對加沙人民。”

Three intelligence sources, however, told +972 and Local Call that junior operatives marked by Lavender were assassinated only with dumb bombs, in the interest of saving more expensive armaments. The implication, one source explained, was that the army would not strike a junior target if they lived in a high-rise building, because the army did not want to spend a more precise and expensive “floor bomb” (with more limited collateral effect) to kill him. But if a junior target lived in a building with only a few floors, the army was authorized to kill him and everyone in the building with a dumb bomb.

然而，三名情報人員告訴當(dāng)?shù)孛襟w，為了節(jié)省更昂貴的武器，被薰衣草標(biāo)記的初級特工只被啞彈暗殺。一位消息人士解釋道，這意味著如果初級目標(biāo)住在高層建筑中，軍隊就不會襲擊他，因為軍隊不想花費更精確、更昂貴（附帶效應(yīng)更有限）的“地板炸彈”來殺死他。但如果一個初級目標(biāo)住在一棟只有幾層的大樓里，軍隊就被授權(quán)用一枚啞彈殺死他和大樓里的所有人。
原創(chuàng)翻譯：龍騰網(wǎng) http://nxnpts.cn 轉(zhuǎn)載請注明出處


“It was like that with all the junior targets,” testified C., who used various automated programs in the current war. “The only question was, is it possible to attack the building in terms of collateral damage? Because we usually carried out the attacks with dumb bombs, and that meant literally destroying the whole house on top of its occupants. But even if an attack is averted, you don’t care — you immediately move on to the next target. Because of the system, the targets never end. You have another 36,000 waiting.”

“所有初級目標(biāo)都是這樣，”在當(dāng)前戰(zhàn)爭中使用過各種自動化程序的 C. 作證說?！拔ㄒ坏膯栴}是，能否以附帶損害的形式襲擊建筑物？因為我們通常使用啞彈進行襲擊，這意味著摧毀整座房屋，包括里面的人。但即使避免了一次襲擊，你也不在乎——你會立即轉(zhuǎn)向下一個目標(biāo)。由于這個系統(tǒng)，目標(biāo)永遠不會結(jié)束。還有 36000 個目標(biāo)在等著你?！?br />