英國(guó)和美國(guó)的關(guān)系有多好?
How good is the relationship between the UK and the USA?譯文簡(jiǎn)介
網(wǎng)友:人們必須理解英國(guó)和美國(guó)聯(lián)盟所基于的堅(jiān)實(shí)、不可動(dòng)搖的基礎(chǔ),以及為何除非發(fā)生文化滅絕級(jí)別的事件,否則這種聯(lián)盟不太可能改變。在地球上可能沒(méi)有兩個(gè)國(guó)家——當(dāng)然沒(méi)有具有任何相關(guān)實(shí)力的國(guó)家——能夠與美國(guó)和英國(guó)之間的緊密程度相媲美。其他可以比較的聯(lián)盟只有加拿大、澳大利亞和新西蘭之間的聯(lián)盟,它們的文化和關(guān)注點(diǎn)都是重疊的。
正文翻譯
How good is the relationship between the UK and the USA?
英國(guó)和美國(guó)的關(guān)系有多好?
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People need to understand the firm, unshifting schist upon which the alliance between the UK and the USA sits and why little short of culture-obliterating events could change that. There are likely no two nations on Earth (certainly, none of any relevant power) that compare to the closeness of the United States and the United Kingdom. The only other alliances that compare are —and with a overlapping culture and concerns— those between the two concerned in this answer and Canada, Australia and New Zealand.
But what about that history? The US and the UK have stood back to back in battle against enemies in the two greatest wars in human history. They share a common language and a quaint cultural enmity towards the other; the kind of faux abrasiveness one observes between close paternal cousins who jostle about and compare sexual prowess or athletic achievement. Every barb, every insult, every smug rejoinder confirms the unique closeness and unspoken love rather than an indicator of any actual enmity.
The Second World War cemented that. It hasn't changed since.
人們必須理解英國(guó)和美國(guó)聯(lián)盟所基于的堅(jiān)實(shí)、不可動(dòng)搖的基礎(chǔ),以及為何除非發(fā)生文化滅絕級(jí)別的事件,否則這種聯(lián)盟不太可能改變。在地球上可能沒(méi)有兩個(gè)國(guó)家——當(dāng)然沒(méi)有具有任何相關(guān)實(shí)力的國(guó)家——能夠與美國(guó)和英國(guó)之間的緊密程度相媲美。其他可以比較的聯(lián)盟只有加拿大、澳大利亞和新西蘭之間的聯(lián)盟,它們的文化和關(guān)注點(diǎn)都是重疊的。
然而,歷史上美國(guó)和英國(guó)在人類(lèi)歷史上最大規(guī)模的兩場(chǎng)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)中并肩作戰(zhàn),共同對(duì)抗敵人。他們共享同一種語(yǔ)言,并且彼此之間有一種奇特的文化敵對(duì)情緒;這類(lèi)似于親密的堂兄弟之間那種表面上的摩擦,他們互相推搡,比較彼此的性能力或運(yùn)動(dòng)成就。每一次挑釁、每一次侮辱、每一次自滿(mǎn)的回?fù)?,?shí)際上都確認(rèn)了他們之間獨(dú)特的親密無(wú)間和不言而喻的愛(ài)意,而不是真正的敵意。
第二次世界大戰(zhàn)加強(qiáng)了這種關(guān)系,自那以后,這一點(diǎn)從未改變。
Churchill's open contempt (indeed, hostility) for Chamberlain cost him politically, nearly to the point of ensuring he'd never be elevated. But as history demonstrated, there was no cost Churchill would not incur to achieve victory against the Nazis. Brutality, it was determined, should be countered by a type of brutality that only England could fashion and had repeatedly demonstrated the capacity to engineer on the rare occasions history called for it. Churchill was not Parliament's first choice, but events sexted the man more than Parliament and more than England
丘吉爾在議會(huì)中從未像公眾或媒體那樣受到廣泛愛(ài)戴;在他的同僚看來(lái),他是對(duì)抗納粹威脅的必要之惡,集中憤怒和精確的侵略性來(lái)對(duì)抗納粹的威脅。海軍大臣對(duì)于為議會(huì)成員敲響戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的戰(zhàn)鼓表現(xiàn)得過(guò)于熱衷。即使在希特勒入侵波蘭之后,議會(huì)更傾向于哈利法克斯勛爵。但哈利法克斯從未表現(xiàn)出興趣(貴族擔(dān)任政府首腦也不合潮流)。丘吉爾幾乎是懇求得到這個(gè)職位,這讓他的議會(huì)同事們感到不快,因?yàn)樗麄冇X(jué)得這種過(guò)于顯眼的競(jìng)選手法非常具有美國(guó)風(fēng)格,因而顯得不夠得體(而且,鑒于丘吉爾接近美國(guó)的血統(tǒng),這看起來(lái)尤其恰當(dāng))。
丘吉爾對(duì)內(nèi)侍的公開(kāi)蔑視(甚至敵意)在政治上讓他付出了代價(jià),幾乎到了確保他永遠(yuǎn)不會(huì)被提升的地步。但歷史表明,為了戰(zhàn)勝納粹,丘吉爾愿意付出任何代價(jià)。英國(guó)政府決定,應(yīng)該用一種只有英國(guó)才能駕馭的殘暴來(lái)對(duì)抗這種殘暴,而且在歷史罕見(jiàn)的情況下,英國(guó)一再展示出駕馭這種殘暴的能力。丘吉爾本不是議會(huì)的首選,丘吉爾不是議會(huì)最初的人選,但是是時(shí)勢(shì)而非議會(huì),更不是英格蘭本身,選擇了他。
At the conclusion of World War II, the British Empire was hocked to the Americans. As mentioned, there was nothing that Churchill --thus the Empire-- would not to do remain in the war and defeat the Nazis. But after the war, that was another story. The Lend-Lease Act put Great Britain into deep debt with the United States. In a parallel universe, the massive, crumbling Empire that the United Kingdom administered, with which she enjoyed a super-special trading agreement that lined her coffers (and made lazy her industries) would be able to pay back the debt within a generation. But the US pounded the final nail into the coffin of the Empire (and the French one to boot): the Atlantic Charter. To get money, both empires had to open the floodgates to American-style capitalism and competition.
In 1945, nothing could compete on the open market with American industry. Nothing could compete in numbers; nothing could compete in quality; nothing could compete in technology. The Atlantic Charter opened the doors of Europe to American cinema that quickly destroyed their local markets. Their stores were flooded with American fashion, TVs, radios, cars and everything in between. That wasn't to last either, but the point is, Britain's one and only way to remain a viable global power was its special relationship with the nations in the Commonwealth-Empire. After that ended, Britain had no choice but to fall into the arms of America.
帝國(guó)贏了;德國(guó)人、意大利人和日本人輸了,這是以巨大的代價(jià)換來(lái)的。
第二次世界大戰(zhàn)結(jié)束時(shí),大英帝國(guó)欠了美國(guó)巨額債務(wù)。正如所提到的,為了繼續(xù)參戰(zhàn)并打敗納粹,沒(méi)有什么是丘吉爾——因此是帝國(guó)——不愿意做的。但戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)結(jié)束后,情況就不同了。《租借法案》使英國(guó)對(duì)美國(guó)負(fù)債累累。在一個(gè)可能的平行世界中,英國(guó)曾經(jīng)管理著一個(gè)龐大但逐漸衰敗的帝國(guó),并且通過(guò)一項(xiàng)特殊的貿(mào)易協(xié)定獲得巨大利益,這項(xiàng)協(xié)定不僅填滿(mǎn)了國(guó)庫(kù),也讓它的相關(guān)產(chǎn)業(yè)變得缺乏競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力。在那個(gè)世界里,英國(guó)本有能力在一代人的時(shí)間里償還所有債務(wù)。然而,美國(guó)通過(guò)大西洋憲章為英國(guó)(以及法國(guó))的帝國(guó)敲響了終結(jié)的鐘聲。為了獲得資金支持,這兩個(gè)帝國(guó)不得不開(kāi)放市場(chǎng),接受美式資本主義和競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的沖擊。
1945年,在公開(kāi)市場(chǎng)上,沒(méi)有什么能與美國(guó)工業(yè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。沒(méi)有什么能在數(shù)量上與之競(jìng)爭(zhēng);沒(méi)有什么能在質(zhì)量上與之競(jìng)爭(zhēng);在技術(shù)方面,沒(méi)有什么能與之競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。大西洋憲章為美國(guó)電影打開(kāi)了歐洲的大門(mén),這些電影很快摧毀了它們的本地市場(chǎng)。他們的商店里充斥著美國(guó)的時(shí)尚、電視、收音機(jī)、汽車(chē)和所有介于其中的商品。這也沒(méi)能持續(xù)多久,但關(guān)鍵是,英國(guó)保持全球強(qiáng)國(guó)地位的唯一途徑是它與英聯(lián)邦國(guó)家的特殊關(guān)系。戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)結(jié)束后,英國(guó)別無(wú)選擇,只能投入美國(guó)的懷抱。
The Brits acquiesced. The invasion collapsed. The Israelis withdrew. The French (oh how they fumed) remade its entire military and foreign policy after that. A 20-year rift in relations between France and the UK ensued. The UK was offered a special deal on nuclear missiles. The French fumed. The US put nukes in Germany. The French fumed. The French counterpunched by keeping the UK out of the EEC until de Gaulle was dead. They remained allies, but it wasn't until Thatcher and Mitterrand that the breach was closed.
但這并不容易。直到蘇伊士運(yùn)河事件之前,英國(guó)人還抱有兩個(gè)幻想,很快這些幻想就破滅了:他們可以開(kāi)出任何面額的支票,山姆大叔都樂(lè)意兌現(xiàn),而英國(guó)仍然有干預(yù)的勇氣。事實(shí)并非如此,蘇伊士運(yùn)河事件的發(fā)生與匈牙利的起義在時(shí)間上非常接近,為蘇聯(lián)提供了政治上的掩護(hù)去壓制那剛剛興起的自由訴求。歐洲或美國(guó)又如何能夠提出抗議呢?艾森豪威爾極其不悅,并且用最嚴(yán)厲的手段表達(dá)了他的不滿(mǎn):他威脅要摧毀英鎊的貨幣價(jià)值。
英國(guó)人默許了。入侵失敗了,以色列人撤退了。法國(guó)人(哦,他們多么憤怒)在那之后重新塑造了整個(gè)軍事和外交政策。英法之間隨之而來(lái)的是20年的關(guān)系裂痕。英國(guó)獲得了一項(xiàng)特殊協(xié)議,獲得了核導(dǎo)彈。法國(guó)人憤怒了。美國(guó)在德國(guó)部署了核武器。法國(guó)人憤怒了,作為反擊,法國(guó)將英國(guó)排除在歐洲經(jīng)濟(jì)共同體之外,直到戴高樂(lè)去世。他們?nèi)匀皇敲擞?,但直到撒切爾和密特朗時(shí)期,這一裂痕才得以彌合。
It has largely worked. Britain, far from being the US's lackey, has fashioned itself into the only tail in history with the potential to wag the whole goddamned dog. And while there are still festering wounds from Iraq, the fact remains that the US never pushed the UK to act and Blair --no one's pushover-- happened to believe both in the mission and British committment to the alliance with the US.
但英國(guó)在考慮自己的地位和與美國(guó)的關(guān)系時(shí)更加務(wù)實(shí)。明白英國(guó)不再擁有超級(jí)大國(guó)地位,自那以后(也就是蘇伊士運(yùn)河的傷痛平復(fù)之后),英國(guó)的外交策略便重新定位:(a) 與美國(guó)建立一種親切友好的關(guān)系,確保在關(guān)鍵時(shí)刻能夠得到美國(guó)的支持;(b) 英國(guó)的行動(dòng)將不再違背華盛頓所明確表達(dá)的利益;(c) 英國(guó)將始終向美國(guó)通報(bào)其所有政策動(dòng)向。
這一策略在很大程度上取得了成功。英國(guó)并沒(méi)有淪為美國(guó)的傀儡,已經(jīng)將自己塑造成了歷史上唯一有潛力顛覆整個(gè)大局的“小卒”。盡管伊拉克戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)造成的創(chuàng)傷仍在,但實(shí)際情況是,美國(guó)從未強(qiáng)迫英國(guó)采取行動(dòng),而布萊爾——他不是輕易屈服的人——恰好既認(rèn)同這一使命,也堅(jiān)信英國(guó)對(duì)與美國(guó)聯(lián)盟的承諾。
Post 9/11, the US and UK (+3) are the two closest allies on the planet. That there are differing perspectives and mutual annoyances (Bush and Blair were further apart politically but closer than can be understood; Obama and Cameron are nearly identical politically speaking, yet are known to not share any friendship), is of little concern. Expect the relationship to continue that way for the remainder of our lives.
但是,盡管英國(guó)人民(以及美國(guó)人民的呼聲太少)感到不安(這是理所應(yīng)當(dāng)?shù)?,美英同盟依然堅(jiān)固。美國(guó)、英國(guó)、加拿大、澳大利亞和新西蘭是唯一共享整個(gè)情報(bào)網(wǎng)絡(luò)的多個(gè)國(guó)家,事實(shí)上,這些國(guó)家的技術(shù)所有權(quán)從哪里開(kāi)始,從哪里結(jié)束,絕對(duì)沒(méi)有區(qū)別。
9/11之后,美國(guó)和英國(guó)(+3)是這個(gè)星球上最親密的兩個(gè)盟友。有不同的觀點(diǎn)和共同的煩惱(布什和布萊爾在政治上的分歧更大,但卻比人們所能理解的更近;奧巴馬和卡梅倫在政治上幾乎是一模一樣的,但眾所周知他們沒(méi)有任何友誼),這沒(méi)什么可擔(dān)心的。期待這種關(guān)系在我們的余生中繼續(xù)下去。
What are some good things in the relationship between the US and the UK? I know there's a lot of hate on Quora but let's talk about positives.
The UK and US have much in common.
Important Defence Allies
Important Intelligence Allies
Important Trade Partners
Shared Political Ideology (Capitalist Democracy)
Shared Culture (Film, Music, Television, Literature, etc)
Shared Language
Shared History
美國(guó)和英國(guó)之間關(guān)系中的一些積極方面是什么?我知道在Quora上有很多仇恨言論,但我們來(lái)談?wù)劮e極的方面。
英國(guó)和美國(guó)有許多共同點(diǎn):
重要的國(guó)防盟友
重要的情報(bào)盟友
重要的貿(mào)易伙伴
共享的政治理念(資本主義民主)
共享的文化(電影、音樂(lè)、電視、文學(xué)等)
共享的語(yǔ)言
共享的歷史
原創(chuàng)翻譯:龍騰網(wǎng) http://nxnpts.cn 轉(zhuǎn)載請(qǐng)注明出處
How close are the US and the UK?
Well the fact that most Americans will tell you they'd die for their UK brothers and sisters speaks volumes and believe it or not (regardless of the anti American stereotypes) the UK would die for Americans as well and we have both done this for eachother
The only other national anthem that has ever played at Buckingham palace from another country was the star spangled banner, as a way to show their support during the tragedy of 9/11. I mean that speaks for itself.
Top it off with the fact that America shares all if not most of it's top secret military secrets with UK, because of the deep trust they have. Hence why so many bases are based in UK. If anything happened to UK Americans would be right there already.
People say we are divided by a commom language but that has two sides. In essence America is born out of the blood of the English and though language is vastly different for a shared language, it's also what helps tie us closer together.
美國(guó)和英國(guó)有多親近?
事實(shí)上,大多數(shù)美國(guó)人會(huì)告訴你,他們會(huì)為他們的英國(guó)兄弟姐妹犧牲,這本身就說(shuō)明了很多事情。不管你信不信(不管反美的刻板印象如何),英國(guó)也會(huì)為美國(guó)人犧牲,我們彼此都這么做過(guò)。
在白金漢宮,除了英國(guó)國(guó)歌之外,唯一演奏過(guò)的外國(guó)國(guó)歌是美國(guó)的《星條旗》,這是在9/11悲劇期間表達(dá)他們支持的方式。我的意思是,這一點(diǎn)本身就很能說(shuō)明問(wèn)題。
再加上美國(guó)與英國(guó)分享幾乎所有的頂級(jí)軍事機(jī)密,因?yàn)樗麄冎g有深厚的信任。這就是為什么那么多美國(guó)基地被設(shè)在英國(guó)。如果英國(guó)出了什么事,美國(guó)人已經(jīng)在那里了。
人們說(shuō)我們被一種共同的語(yǔ)言所分隔,但這種說(shuō)法有兩面性。本質(zhì)上,美國(guó)是誕生于英國(guó)人的血液,盡管語(yǔ)言有很大的不同,但它也是幫助我們更加緊密聯(lián)系在一起的因素。
All of this earned the unique title of “special relationship" which is unparalleled throughout the world and history. When one falls the other picks them up or falls trying. All this born out of such horrific history between the two countries is nothing short of miraculous.
I could go on but in the end, if citizens from either country bad mouth the other, they clearly need a reality check because as far as friends go we are the best for eachother that one can get
最終,你們是兩個(gè)有著深厚歷史、緊密的經(jīng)濟(jì)和文化聯(lián)系、根深蒂固的紐帶、以及相似的目標(biāo)、政治、環(huán)境立場(chǎng)和宗教理念的國(guó)家。
所有這些都贏得了“特殊關(guān)系”這一獨(dú)特的稱(chēng)號(hào),這在全世界和歷史上都是無(wú)與倫比的。當(dāng)一方跌倒時(shí),另一個(gè)會(huì)扶起它,或者嘗試著跌倒。這一切都源于兩國(guó)之間如此可怕的歷史,這簡(jiǎn)直是奇跡。
我可以繼續(xù)說(shuō)下去,但歸根結(jié)底,如果來(lái)自任何一個(gè)國(guó)家的公民詆毀對(duì)方,他們顯然需要現(xiàn)實(shí)檢查,因?yàn)榫团笥讯?,我們是彼此能得到的最好的朋友?/b>
Let’s put it this way:
The tone of the relationship is set by the incoming US President, never our PM. The former’s actions are proactive, the latter’s reactionary. For example Obama was more amenable than Trump, and Trump less dismissive than Biden, while our PM’s are uniformly obsequious to all of them
While the UK has a professional and effective military, we are still hugely dependent on the US, as the setting of the evacuation deadline in Kabul by the US, not by allies make clear. Nor would have the UK or other allies would have gone into Bosnia, Syria or Iraq without US involvement.
讓我們這樣看問(wèn)題:
美國(guó)與英國(guó)關(guān)系的基調(diào)通常由新上任的美國(guó)總統(tǒng)來(lái)設(shè)定,而不是我們的首相來(lái)設(shè)定。美國(guó)總統(tǒng)的行動(dòng)往往具有主動(dòng)性,而我們的首相則更多是被動(dòng)反應(yīng)。例如,奧巴馬比特朗普更易于溝通,拜登又比特朗普更輕視人一點(diǎn),而我們的首相對(duì)所有美國(guó)總統(tǒng)都表現(xiàn)得過(guò)分順從。
雖然英國(guó)擁有專(zhuān)業(yè)且高效的軍事力量,但我們?cè)诤艽蟪潭壬先匀灰蕾?lài)于美國(guó),正如在喀布爾設(shè)定的撤離最后期限是由美國(guó)單方面決定的,而不是與盟友協(xié)商的結(jié)果一樣。如果沒(méi)有美國(guó)的參與,英國(guó)或其他盟友也不會(huì)介入波斯尼亞、敘利亞或伊拉克的事務(wù)。
The common cultural and language and historical arguments are suspect too, given that there are closer ties to Canada, Oz and NZ but no “special relationship.”
The special relationship exists primarily in the minds of those UK politicians and individuals wishing greater prestige by association with a superpower than we actually have in reality without that association. From the American side, the premise is based on cultural and historical affinity, not political or economic reality.
美國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)規(guī)模大約是我們的八倍。如果說(shuō)我們?cè)?jīng)擁有更多的經(jīng)濟(jì)影響力,那也是在我們還是歐盟的一部分時(shí),但脫歐后情況已不再如此。美國(guó)可以就愛(ài)爾蘭邊境問(wèn)題向我們的總理尋求要求和保證,但沒(méi)有人能夠?qū)γ绹?guó)自己的邊境政策指手畫(huà)腳。當(dāng)前,美國(guó)對(duì)英國(guó)旅行者實(shí)施COVID禁令,但英國(guó)卻不能對(duì)美國(guó)旅行者采取對(duì)等措施,這清楚地強(qiáng)化了美國(guó)在這一關(guān)系中的主導(dǎo)地位。
關(guān)于共同的文化、語(yǔ)言和歷史聯(lián)系的論點(diǎn)也存在疑問(wèn),畢竟我們與加拿大、澳大利亞和新西蘭有著更緊密的聯(lián)系,但卻并未形成所謂的“特殊關(guān)系”。
所謂的“特殊關(guān)系”主要存在于那些希望借助與超級(jí)大國(guó)的聯(lián)系來(lái)提升自身聲望的英國(guó)政治家和個(gè)人的想象中,這并非基于我們實(shí)際擁有的影響力。從美國(guó)的角度來(lái)看,這種關(guān)系更多是基于文化和歷史的親近,而非政治或經(jīng)濟(jì)的現(xiàn)實(shí)考量。