Sun Tzu and Carl von Clausewitz are the two most well-known and respected strategic thinkers in history. Their dramatically different theories stimulate considerable debate over who is the greater strategist.

孫子和卡爾·馮·克勞塞維茨都是歷史上最著名、最受尊敬的戰(zhàn)略思想家。他們截然不同的理論引發(fā)了激烈爭(zhēng)論，到底誰(shuí)更偉大。

In the history of military strategy, no theorists garner the same respect or have had as much influence as Sun Tzu and Carl von Clausewitz within their respective traditions. Sun Tzu was a Chinese general and ancient military strategist from the 5th century BC and reputed author of Bingfa (The Art of War), the earliest known work on strategy. Carl von Clausewitz was a Prussian general and strategist from the late 18th and early 19th centuries who fought in the Napoleonic Wars. He is famous for his work Vom Kriege (On War) published in 1832.

在軍事戰(zhàn)略史上，沒(méi)有哪個(gè)理論家像孫子和克勞塞維茨那樣，在各自的傳統(tǒng)中獲得了相似的尊重或具有如此大的影響力。孫子生活在公元前5世紀(jì)，是中國(guó)古代著名的軍事戰(zhàn)略家，著有《孫子兵法》，這是已知的最早的軍事戰(zhàn)略著作。卡爾·馮·克勞塞維茨是生活在18世紀(jì)末到19世紀(jì)初普魯士的軍事家和戰(zhàn)略家，曾參加過(guò)拿破侖戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)。1832年因?yàn)槌霭妗稇?zhàn)爭(zhēng)論》而聞名

The works of these renowned strategists comprise two of the most respected and well-known military classics ever produced, and they have generated a fascinating dialectic thanks to the remarkable differences in their respective theories. This article will compare and contrast some of the most poignant principles found in Sun Tzu’s Art of War and Clausewitz’s On War, and in doing so will pose the age-old question: who is the greatest military strategist of all time?

兩位著名軍事家的著作成為有史以來(lái)最受尊敬和最著名的軍事經(jīng)典著作，由于理論的顯著差異，兩部著作產(chǎn)生了令人著迷的邏輯辯證。本文將比較和對(duì)比《孫子兵法》和克勞塞維茨《戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)論》中最深刻的軍事準(zhǔn)則，并提出一個(gè)古老的問(wèn)題:誰(shuí)是有史以來(lái)最偉大的軍事戰(zhàn)略家?

What Was Warfare For Sun Tzu And Clausewitz?

在孫子和克勞塞維茨看來(lái)，戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)是什么?


The first significant difference between Sun Tzu and Clausewitz is their frxwork. Their definitions of warfare have a very different scope and range of elements, which set the stage for the rest of their respective philosophies.

孫子和克勞塞維茨兩人的第一個(gè)顯著區(qū)別是結(jié)構(gòu)不同。他們對(duì)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的定義和戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)要素都有著截然不動(dòng)的解釋，這為他們的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)哲學(xué)奠定了基礎(chǔ)。

Sun Tzu’s frxwork consists of an expansive perspective on warfare which included not only military matters, but also a large variety of non-military factors that nevertheless influence the military realm, such as diplomacy, economics, and psychology. Perhaps due to this broader frxwork, Sun Tzu was very cognizant of the potential ramifications that waging unlimited warfare can have on non-military matters, and he highlights the importance of minimizing these costs as much as possible.

孫子的軍事結(jié)構(gòu)包含廣闊的視角，不僅包括軍事，也包括大量非軍事但影響軍事領(lǐng)域的因素，如外交，經(jīng)濟(jì)和心理。也許是由于更廣泛的結(jié)構(gòu)，孫子非常清楚發(fā)動(dòng)沒(méi)有限制的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)對(duì)非軍事事務(wù)可能產(chǎn)生的潛在后果，他的理論強(qiáng)調(diào)了盡可能減少這些成本的重要性。

Because of this awareness, Sun Tzu urges generals to pursue a maximin strategy, in which he achieves the outcome that yields the smallest loss, rather than the greatest reward. A general must be calculating, rational, and unswayed by visions of personal heroism.

由于這種意識(shí)，孫子敦促將軍們追求最大最很小戰(zhàn)略，那就是用最小的損失來(lái)獲得最大的回報(bào)。指揮官必須精于算計(jì)、理性、不能受到個(gè)人英雄主義的影響。


Clausewitz’s frxwork is much narrower and more strictly defined, consisting exclusively of military matters. He recognizes the importance of other arenas and that warfare is never an isolated act —indeed he is famous for his aphorism that “war is a continuation of politics by other means” — but these factors have little bearing on the duty of a general. Clausewitz defines war as “an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will.” Victory is the obxt and violence is the means. Other factors only matter insofar as they impact a general’s ability to win the war.

克勞塞維茨的結(jié)構(gòu)要窄得多，定義也更嚴(yán)格，只包括軍事問(wèn)題。他認(rèn)識(shí)到其他領(lǐng)域的重要性，戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)從來(lái)不是孤立的行為。他確實(shí)以“戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)是政治的繼續(xù)，外加一些別的手段”這句格言而聞名，但這些因素對(duì)將軍的職責(zé)幾乎沒(méi)有影響。克勞塞維茨將戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)定義為“迫使敵人服從我們意志的一種暴力行為?！?勝利是目的，暴力是手段。其他因素只有在對(duì)將軍贏得戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的能力有影響時(shí)才重要。

Warfare requires aggression; the defensive position is the stronger position, but an absolute defense contradicts the idea of war. The offensive is required to win the war and achieve a positive obxtive. Clausewitz favors a stance of bold risk-taking balanced with rational calculations. A great general is one who successfully implements a maximax strategy, in which the very best outcome is achieved.

戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)需要攻擊;防御會(huì)處于更有利的地位，但絕對(duì)防御是與戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)觀念相矛盾的。進(jìn)攻是為了贏得戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)，并取得積極的目的?？藙谌S茨傾向于采取大膽冒險(xiǎn)的立場(chǎng)，并輔以理性的計(jì)算。偉大的將軍要能成功地實(shí)施最大限度的策略，從而取得最好的結(jié)果。

Peace Vs War

和平與戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)


Due to the scope of their differing frxworks, Sun Tzu and Clausewitz drew different conclusions about the nature of peace and conflict itself.

由于戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)結(jié)構(gòu)的范圍不同，孫子和克勞塞維茨對(duì)和平與沖突的性質(zhì)也有著不同的結(jié)論。

Because Sun Tzu included non-military matters in his scope of warfare, his distinction between the states of war and peace is rather blurred. While military struggles do not always exist, conflict is permanent in other arenas, such as politics, economics, and society at large. In this sense, warfare is continuous. Due to this conclusion, it makes sense that Sun Tzu prioritized a maximin strategy in which a general is prudent about the use of his resources.

因?yàn)閷O子把非軍事因素包括在戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)范圍內(nèi)，他對(duì)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)狀態(tài)和和平狀態(tài)的區(qū)分是相當(dāng)模糊的。雖然軍事斗爭(zhēng)并不總是存在，但政治、經(jīng)濟(jì)和社會(huì)等其他領(lǐng)域，沖突卻是永久性的。從這個(gè)意義上說(shuō)，戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)是連續(xù)的。由于這個(gè)結(jié)論，孫子把將軍謹(jǐn)慎使用資源作為優(yōu)先考慮的策略是有道理的。

In an ongoing conflict, minimizing one’s losses can make all the difference between capitulating early and surviving the long game. This is not to say that Sun Tzu is ambivalent about ending military conflicts; on the contrary, he urges generals to be slow to start wars and quick to end them. Also because of this blurring of war and peace, the centers of gravity in warfare for Sun Tzu are relegated to the highest political and strategic levels.

在持續(xù)的沖突中，早點(diǎn)認(rèn)輸還是在長(zhǎng)期博弈中幸存，這對(duì)能否最大限度地減少自己的損失就至關(guān)重要了。這并不是說(shuō)，孫子對(duì)結(jié)束軍事沖突持矛盾態(tài)度; 相反，他敦促將軍們發(fā)動(dòng)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)要慢，結(jié)束戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)要快。也因?yàn)閼?zhàn)爭(zhēng)與和平定義的模糊，孫子對(duì)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的重心被降級(jí)到最高政治和戰(zhàn)略層面。

Clausewitz’s narrow definition of warfare allowed him to make a very clear distinction between the states of war and peace. Conflict exists only when the military is engaged; as such, winning a war is the fastest and most effective way of returning society to a state of peace. Clausewitz develops an extensive theoretical system concerning the centers of gravity in warfare, identifying them first on the military operational level, and only secondly on a larger strategic level. The operational level is highlighted to encourage generals toward bold and effective action that will decisively end the conflict and restore society to peace.

克勞塞維茨對(duì)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的狹義定義使他能夠非常清楚地區(qū)分戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)狀態(tài)和和平狀態(tài)。軍事介入才會(huì)產(chǎn)生沖突；因此，贏得戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)是回到和平狀態(tài)的最快和最有效的方法?？藙谌S茨提供了一個(gè)廣泛的關(guān)于戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)重心的理論體系，首先在軍事行動(dòng)層面上予以確定，其次在更大的戰(zhàn)略層面上確定。強(qiáng)調(diào)行動(dòng)層面，鼓勵(lì)將軍們采取大膽和有效的行動(dòng)，果斷結(jié)束沖突，恢復(fù)社會(huì)和平。

The differences between Sun Tzu’s and Clausewitz’s conceptions of peace and war may reflect the times they lived in. Sun Tzu wrote during the chaotic Warring States Period in China, when ongoing and escalating warfare could easily ruin a state that was not careful about resource-conservation, whereas Clausewitz wrote during the 19th century, a time of transition towards intermittent but large-scale modern warfare, carried out between powerful nations in an increasingly globalized world.

孫子和克勞塞維茨在和平與戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)觀念上的不同，可能是因?yàn)樗麄兯幍臅r(shí)代不同。孫子的軍事理論是中國(guó)混亂的戰(zhàn)國(guó)時(shí)期產(chǎn)生的，那個(gè)時(shí)期各國(guó)之間沖突不斷，戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)規(guī)模不斷升級(jí)，如果某個(gè)國(guó)家不小心保持實(shí)力，很容易就會(huì)被滅國(guó)；而克勞塞維茨的著作是在19世紀(jì)完成的，19世紀(jì)是日益全球化，強(qiáng)國(guó)之間的沖突正演變?yōu)殚g歇性但大規(guī)模的現(xiàn)代戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)。

The Economy Of Force

使用武力的考量
原創(chuàng)翻譯：龍騰網(wǎng) http://nxnpts.cn 轉(zhuǎn)載請(qǐng)注明出處



The role of force in each strategists’ theory has already been touched upon, but it deserves to be further explored. Force embodies a central position for both Sun Tzu and Clausewitz, not only in their respective strategies, but also in the differences between them.

每個(gè)戰(zhàn)略家的理論中都會(huì)提到武力在戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)中扮演的角色，但是這個(gè)問(wèn)題其實(shí)需要進(jìn)一步探討。武力在孫子和克勞塞維茨的軍事理論中處于核心地位，不僅體現(xiàn)在他們各自的策略上，也體現(xiàn)在兩者的差異上。

For Sun Tzu, force should be used sparingly, and only relied upon after all other options are exhausted. Instead of relying on brute force, an army’s strength should be supplemented by force multipliers such as terrain, surprise, and other factors that offer a comparative advantage. Effectiveness is not more important than efficiency, because a state that wins a war but emerges irreparably weakened cannot enjoy its victory for long.

對(duì)于孫子來(lái)說(shuō)，應(yīng)該謹(jǐn)慎使用武力，只有其他選擇都用盡之后才會(huì)使用武力。武力并不是蠻力，而應(yīng)該由地形、奇襲和其他增加武力優(yōu)勢(shì)的因素來(lái)補(bǔ)充。效果并不比效率更重要，因?yàn)橼A得戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)，卻被嚴(yán)重削弱的國(guó)家享受勝利的時(shí)間不會(huì)太長(zhǎng)。

In this sense, Sun Tzu’s theory centers around the avoidance of hastily-used force. He instead encourages generals to utilize strategies and tactics to create the ideal conditions for the precise use of force to be effective. The Art of War speaks extensively about the importance of knowledge, deception, and formlessness to create these conditions.

在這個(gè)意義上，孫子的理論以避免草率使用武力為中心。相反，他鼓勵(lì)將軍們利用戰(zhàn)略和戰(zhàn)術(shù)，為準(zhǔn)確有效地使用武力創(chuàng)造理想條件?！秾O子兵法》廣泛地闡述了知識(shí)、欺騙和虛實(shí)對(duì)創(chuàng)造這些條件的重要性。

The ideal commander gathers intelligence on his enemy. He is clever in using deception and unorthodox methods to surprise his opponent. He masters form and formlessness; to know the enemy while remaining hidden himself. The commander attacks only when he has the advantage and victory is assured, and he does so in a swift precision strike.

理想的指揮官要收集敵人的情報(bào)，善于用欺騙和虛實(shí)的方法給對(duì)手造成出其不意的打擊。掌握虛與實(shí); 了解敵人，隱藏自己。指揮官只有在占據(jù)優(yōu)勢(shì)和有把握的情況下再發(fā)動(dòng)攻擊，而且攻擊要又快又準(zhǔn)。


Clausewitz considers force to be not only necessary, but the most effective strategy. Maximum force should be utilized as early as possible to end the war in the shortest possible time frx. Clausewitz is results-oriented. Effectiveness is more important than efficiency, and resources lost in a large battle can be absorbed if the battle brings a decisive victory that ends the war. However, this is not to say that Clausewitz was blind to the fact that manpower is hard to regain once lost.

克勞塞維茨認(rèn)為武力不僅必要，而且最有效。為了在最短的時(shí)間內(nèi)結(jié)束戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)，應(yīng)盡早動(dòng)用最大兵力。克勞塞維茨的軍事理論是以結(jié)果為導(dǎo)向。效果比效率更重要，大型戰(zhàn)役中損失的資源，帶來(lái)的結(jié)果是結(jié)束戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的決定性勝利，那么這些損失都可以被吸收。但這并不是說(shuō)克勞塞維茨忽視了人力一旦失去就很難恢復(fù)的事實(shí)。

To best achieve victory, force must be wielded both boldly and strategically. The ideal commander can balance the two with acumen; he is capable and decisive, a strategic and tactical genius, and has an immense presence of mind, imagination, and strength of will. This general will identify a weak point in the enemy’s defenses and launch a concentrated force directly at that weak point. He does this on the higher strategic level, but especially on the operational level when conducting a battle.

為了獲得優(yōu)勢(shì)勝利，必須戰(zhàn)略而且大膽地使用武力。理想的指揮者能夠敏銳地在兩者之間找到平衡，有能力、果斷，戰(zhàn)略和戰(zhàn)術(shù)天才，要有很強(qiáng)的意識(shí)、想象力和意志力。這樣就能找出敵人防御的薄弱環(huán)節(jié)，并集中兵力直接景工敵方的薄弱環(huán)節(jié)。將軍要在戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的更高戰(zhàn)略層面掌控，尤其是在作戰(zhàn)層面。

The Ideal Victory

理想的勝利


Unsurprisingly, Sun Tzu and Clausewitz have exceedingly different ideals for victory. This includes both the circumstances and strategy leading to victory as well as the nature of the victory itself, and reflects their opinions about the use of force.

不出所料，孫子和克勞塞維茨對(duì)于理想的勝利有著截然不同的觀點(diǎn)。這既包括勝利的環(huán)境和戰(zhàn)略，也包括勝利的性質(zhì)，反映了他們對(duì)用兵的看法。

For Sun Tzu, the greatest victory is to win without actual combat. Convince the enemy army to surrender before battle even begins. To do so, Sun Tzu’s preferred implementation of strategy involves non-military means and the conservation of military force until the right moment. Sun Tzu wrote that “to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting.”

孫子認(rèn)為最偉大的勝利是不戰(zhàn)而勝。不戰(zhàn)而屈人之兵。為了做到這一點(diǎn)，孫子首選的戰(zhàn)略包括非軍事手段和保存軍事實(shí)力，等待恰當(dāng)?shù)臅r(shí)機(jī)。孫子寫道:“是故百戰(zhàn)百勝，非善之善也；不戰(zhàn)而屈人之兵，善之善者也。”
原創(chuàng)翻譯：龍騰網(wǎng) http://nxnpts.cn 轉(zhuǎn)載請(qǐng)注明出處


Clausewitz’s ideal victory is to annihilate the enemy’s army in a decisive major battle. The primary tool for implementing his strategy is that of force; other tools are available but not considered paramount. However, the appearance of simplicity in Clausewitz’s formula should not be mistaken for a lack of sophistication.

克勞塞維茨理想的勝利是在一場(chǎng)決定性的重大戰(zhàn)役中殲滅敵人的軍隊(duì)。實(shí)施他的戰(zhàn)略的主要工具是武力; 其他工具也可用，但不是最重要的。然而，克勞塞維茨公式中簡(jiǎn)潔的表象不應(yīng)被誤解為缺乏復(fù)雜性。

He wrote, “Everything is very simple in War, but the simplest thing is difficult.” The general must overcome any number of unforeseen circumstances and difficulties. Clausewitz was particularly aware of the immense complexities introduced by the ever-developing technological realities of modern warfare.

他寫道:“戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的一切都很簡(jiǎn)單，但最簡(jiǎn)單的事情也很困難?！睂④姳仨毧朔S多無(wú)法預(yù)料的情況和困難?？藙谌S茨特別注意到現(xiàn)代戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)中不斷發(fā)展的技術(shù)現(xiàn)實(shí)所帶來(lái)的巨大復(fù)雜性。

What Do Their Strategies Look Like In Practice?

他們的策略在實(shí)踐中是什么樣子的?


Discussing differences in points of theory is all well and good, but what do Sun Tzu’s and Clausewitz’s strategies look like in practice? Here is a general outline of each’s preferred strategies in order of priority, assuming that the shared obxtive is to defeat an enemy nation.

討論理論觀點(diǎn)的不同當(dāng)然好，但是孫子和克勞塞維茨的策略在實(shí)踐中的效果如何呢? 假設(shè)他們的共同目標(biāo)是打敗敵國(guó)，下面是他們各自優(yōu)先選擇的策略概要。

Sun Tzu’s first suggestion is to attack the enemy’s strategy before ever engaging with their forces. If the enemy commander’s strategy can be neutralized, then the war is mostly won. But if that can’t be done, then Sun Tzu’s second choice is to break up the enemy’s alliances before war breaks out. Only after attempting these should the general attack the enemy’s army, and if all else fails, he may attack the enemy’s cities.

孫子的第一個(gè)建議是在與敵人交戰(zhàn)之前先攻擊敵人的策略。如果敵人指揮官的策略能夠被壓制，那么戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)就基本取得了勝利。如果做不到這一點(diǎn)，那么孫子的第二個(gè)選擇就是在戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)爆發(fā)前瓦解敵人的聯(lián)盟。只有在做了這些嘗試之后，將軍才可以進(jìn)攻敵人的軍隊(duì)，如果其他選項(xiàng)都失敗了，他可能會(huì)建議進(jìn)攻敵人的城市。

Clausewitz first and foremost encourages the destruction of the enemy’s army as a general’s top priority. If that doesn’t work, he may attempt to seize the enemy’s capital. If destroying their army or seizing their capital fails, then the commander should militarily defeat the enemy’s allies. Only after these military operations fail does Clausewitz suggest attacking the enemy’s leader or public opinion.

克勞塞維茨會(huì)最先鼓勵(lì)把摧毀敵人的軍隊(duì)作為首要任務(wù)。如果不起作用，他可能會(huì)建議奪取敵人的首都。如果消滅軍隊(duì)或奪取首都失敗了，那么指揮官應(yīng)該在軍事上擊敗敵人的盟友。只有在這些軍事行動(dòng)失敗后，克勞塞維茨才建議攻擊敵人的首領(lǐng)或公眾輿論。

The Strategists’ Advantages And Disadvantages

兩位戰(zhàn)略家的優(yōu)點(diǎn)和缺點(diǎn)


Both Sun Tzu’s Art of War and Clausewitz’s On War provide comprehensive strategies for land powers. They are remarkable in their different approaches, and together create a fascinating dialogue concerning how warfare should be conducted.

《孫子兵法》和克勞塞維茨的《戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)論》都為陸權(quán)提供了全面的戰(zhàn)略。它們以不同的方法而引人注目，并共同創(chuàng)造了關(guān)于如何進(jìn)行戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的迷人對(duì)話。

Sun Tzu’s maximin strategy desires the least costly victories and prefers non-military approaches. This is prudent in that it recognizes the importance of resources in long-term conflicts and acknowledges the broader non-military context around warfare. Sun Tzu also displays an impressive understanding of psychological warfare. However, his strategy has been criticized for being overly idealistic and hesitant to recognize the inevitability of violent conflict in war.

孫子的最大策略是希望以最少的代價(jià)取得勝利，并傾向于非軍事手段。這是謹(jǐn)慎的，因?yàn)樗J(rèn)識(shí)到資源在長(zhǎng)期沖突中的重要性，并承認(rèn)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)擁有更廣泛的非軍事背景。孫子對(duì)心理戰(zhàn)也有深刻的理解。但是，有人批評(píng)他的戰(zhàn)略過(guò)于理想化，沒(méi)有認(rèn)識(shí)到戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)中暴力沖突的必然性。

Clausewitz’s maximax strategy recognizes the effective use of force and risk-taking as the fastest way to victory. His approach is realistic and relevant for most types of warfare. However, his strategy can very easily accrue high costs in damages, and he has been criticized for underestimating some non-military aspects of warfare as well as relying too heavily upon force to defeat the enemy.

克勞塞維茨的大中求大戰(zhàn)略認(rèn)為有效使用武力和冒險(xiǎn)是取得勝利的最快途徑。對(duì)于大多數(shù)類型的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)來(lái)說(shuō)他的方法現(xiàn)實(shí)而且適用。然而，他的戰(zhàn)略很容易造成很高的損失，有人批評(píng)他低估了戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的非軍事方面的背景，以及過(guò)于依賴武力擊敗敵人。
原創(chuàng)翻譯：龍騰網(wǎng) http://nxnpts.cn 轉(zhuǎn)載請(qǐng)注明出處


Who Was The Greater Strategist: Sun Tzu Or Clausewitz?

誰(shuí)是偉大的戰(zhàn)略家:孫子還是克勞塞維茨?


Who is the greatest strategist of all time? After this cursory comparative analysis of their strategies as found in Sun Tzu’s The Art of War and Carl von Clausewitz’s On War, it should be apparent that both offer profound insights into the art of strategy. Both have stimulated centuries of additional dialogue, shaping not only major conflicts but the military strategies of entire nations. Who is the greatest? I shall leave it to the reader to decide.

誰(shuí)是有史以來(lái)最偉大的戰(zhàn)略家? 通過(guò)對(duì)《孫子兵法》和卡爾·馮·克勞塞維茨的《戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)論》中的戰(zhàn)略進(jìn)行粗略的比較分析，我們可以明顯地看到，這兩本書都對(duì)戰(zhàn)略藝術(shù)提供了深刻的見解。 兩部作品都激發(fā)了幾個(gè)世紀(jì)的額外對(duì)話，不僅塑造了重大沖突，而且塑造了整個(gè)國(guó)家的軍事戰(zhàn)略。 誰(shuí)是最偉大的? 就留給讀者去決定吧。