澳大利亞軍事專家撰文：韓國(guó)想要建造國(guó)產(chǎn)航母，但他們其實(shí)并不需要航母

KiraTheMaster
The article explains how horribly flawed is South Korea's defense strategy. It appears that South Koreans never consider North Korea as a threat at all.

這篇文章解釋了韓國(guó)的國(guó)防戰(zhàn)略存在多么可怕的缺陷。韓國(guó)人似乎從未將朝鮮視為威脅。

SuppiluliumaX
Apart from their probable nuclear threat, the North Korean army is not the same as in the 1950s. So, the North Koreans are not really a threat to South Korea now, China is a way bigger problem for them.

除了可能的核威脅，朝鮮軍隊(duì)已經(jīng)和上世紀(jì)50年代不一樣了。現(xiàn)在的朝鮮對(duì)韓國(guó)來(lái)說(shuō)并不是真正的威脅，中國(guó)是一個(gè)更大的問題。

OldManOnCampus
I'd argue that the tens of thousands of artillery pieces aimed at Seoul remain the same threat .

我不同意，瞄準(zhǔn)首爾的數(shù)萬(wàn)門朝鮮大炮仍然是個(gè)大威脅。

PeKaYking
There isn't any technology that's capable of protecting cities against artillery, and I assume that the Korean strategists assume that in case of an actual war, their military with vastly superior technology would be capable of swiftly capturing NK's artillery positions.
artillery isn't nearly as good at "leveling cities" as many people assume. In WW2 cities were besieged and bombarded with artillery for months on end uninterrupted, and the cities still weren't wiped off the map. If you watch any videos from Syria where buildings get hit by artillery shells, they very rarely are leveled by it in some kind of house of cards manner, rather it just makes a meter or two wide hole in the outer wall. This idea that North Korea can just wipe Seoul off the map in a few days or weeks with its conventional artillery is just not true.

沒有任何技術(shù)能夠保護(hù)城市不受火炮的攻擊，我猜韓國(guó)戰(zhàn)略家們認(rèn)為，一旦發(fā)生戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)，他們先進(jìn)的軍隊(duì)將能夠迅速摧毀占領(lǐng)朝鮮的炮兵陣地。
火炮并不像許多人想象的那樣能夠“夷平城市”。在第二次世界大戰(zhàn)中，城市被包圍，被炮火連續(xù)轟炸幾個(gè)月，但這些城市仍然沒有從地圖上消失。如果你看過(guò)任何敘利亞戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的視頻，你會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)建筑物很少會(huì)被炮彈夷為平地，而只是在外墻上打出一個(gè)個(gè)直徑一米或兩米寬的洞。這種認(rèn)為朝鮮可以在幾天或幾周內(nèi)用其常規(guī)火炮將首爾從地圖上抹去的想法是不正確的。

lordderplythethird
It actually lacks even an overall fundamental comprehension of ROK's battleplans against DPRK, should DPRK forces invade, and frankly I'm surprised to see something so ignorant and riddled with bias here.
ROK's core defense strategy in the event of an invasion is to conduct an amphibious operation BEHIND the invading DPRK forces. This is done to basically send the invasion into an immediate halt, as the invading forces would now be faced with a 2 front battle, and would be doing so with their resupply routes cut off. The bulk of ROK's population and wealth resides in the northern regions closest to DPRK, so crippling an invasion as fast as it begins is paramount.
HOWEVER, virtually all ROK fighter squadrons are in the southern end of the peninsula, due to the credible threat posed to them from DPRK short/medium/long range missiles (something this article outright REFUSES to address). Because of this, land-based air power is not immediately on call in the event of an invasion, and potentially won't even be available at all depending on how effective a ballistic missile first strike is. A combat loaded F-16, the main fighter of the ROK Air Force, has a max combat range of around just 300 miles. It's over 150 miles from Gunsan Airport, the main F-16 base in ROK, just to the border north of Seoul. It's over 200 miles from Gunsan to Pyongyang. That's just a straight shot and not going through certain corridors that are less defended, or god forbid engaging in any defensive action, which will cripple that range. DPRK has over 500 medium-long range air defense batteries. Yes, they're not state of the art, but an S-125 can bring down an F -16 just fine as we saw in Desert Storm and Yugoslavia. As such, the safest route from Gunsan to Pyongyang is likely around 700 miles one way (out to Sea of Japan, north to the east of Hamhung, bank it, and go south straight into Pyongyang) due to the current low risk to DPRK from that avenue. 700 miles is more than all of ROK's fighters besides the F-15K can do. Yes, tankers exist, but tankers are easy prey that close to a front... So to suggest that ROK aircraft have the range to strike anywhere they want in DPRK is woefully misleading, bordering on (IMO) a blatant lie.
A carrier, even a light carrier such as what ROK is considering here, is 1000% a serious asset in providing near instant airpower for either front. Not only that, but the carrier could be operating in the Sea of Japan, striking critical DPRK facilities on their eastern coast, and forcing DPRK to divert resources from the invasion to that fight.

事實(shí)上，這篇文章甚至缺乏對(duì)韓國(guó)（針對(duì)朝鮮的）作戰(zhàn)計(jì)劃的基本理解，坦率地說(shuō)，我很驚訝在這里看到如此無(wú)知且充滿偏見的文章。
面對(duì)朝鮮入侵，韓國(guó)的核心防御戰(zhàn)略，是在入侵的朝鮮軍隊(duì)背后進(jìn)行兩棲作戰(zhàn)。這樣做是為了遏制朝鮮軍隊(duì)的入侵勢(shì)頭,讓入侵部隊(duì)陷入腹背受敵的境地，并將他們的補(bǔ)給路線切斷。
韓國(guó)的人口和經(jīng)濟(jì)區(qū)大部分位于北部接近朝鮮的地區(qū),所以斬?cái)喑r的進(jìn)攻勢(shì)頭是首要任務(wù)。
然而，實(shí)際上所有的韓國(guó)戰(zhàn)斗機(jī)中隊(duì)都在半島的南端，因?yàn)樗麄兠媾R著來(lái)自朝鮮短程/中短程/遠(yuǎn)程導(dǎo)彈的威脅(這篇文章拒絕討論這個(gè)問題)。
正因?yàn)槿绱?，在入侵發(fā)生時(shí)，韓國(guó)的陸基空中力量不能立即待命，甚至可能根本無(wú)法使用，這取決于朝鮮彈道導(dǎo)彈第一波次打擊的有效性。由于韓國(guó)空軍主力戰(zhàn)斗機(jī)F16的最大作戰(zhàn)航程只有300英里左右。韓國(guó)主要的空軍基地群山機(jī)場(chǎng)，就在首爾北部靠近邊境的位置。從群山機(jī)場(chǎng)到平壤有兩百多英里的直線距離。如果要繞道穿越朝鮮防空力量較弱的空中走廊，航程就會(huì)進(jìn)一步增大。
朝鮮擁有500多套中遠(yuǎn)程防空單位。是的，它們不是最先進(jìn)的，但S-125可以擊落F -16，就像我們?cè)谏衬L(fēng)暴和南斯拉夫戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)中看到的那樣。
因此，從群山機(jī)場(chǎng)到平壤最安全的單程路線可能達(dá)到700英里左右，(起飛進(jìn)入日本海，向北飛到咸興市以東，繞過(guò)咸興市，然后向南直接進(jìn)入平壤)，目前這條路線對(duì)韓國(guó)來(lái)說(shuō)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)很低。
除了F-15K，所有韓國(guó)戰(zhàn)機(jī)的航程都達(dá)不到700英里。是的，可以使用加油機(jī)，但靠近前線的加油機(jī)很容易成為獵物……說(shuō)韓國(guó)戰(zhàn)斗機(jī)有能力打擊朝鮮的任何地方純粹是誤導(dǎo)，在我看來(lái)，這是赤裸裸的謊言。
一艘航母，即使是韓國(guó)這樣的輕型航母，也絕對(duì)是一個(gè)極其重要的作戰(zhàn)單位，可以為前線提供即時(shí)的空中支援力量。不僅如此，航母還可以在日本海作戰(zhàn)，打擊朝鮮東部沿海的關(guān)鍵設(shè)施，迫使朝鮮將資源從入侵轉(zhuǎn)移到防御中去。

ROK expects to realistically be on their own for 5-30 days, at which point US forces will be mobilized and joining the fight.
ROK likely could not defeat DPRK on their own. DPRK's military is simply too large, for ROK's forces to defeat them. For example, the K2 tank is arguably one of the best in the world, yet M48s make up almost half their MBT fleet. They're a mix of old and new, and there's A LOT more old than new. Does having 200 K2s mean all that much if the bulk of your fleet are M48s and your enemy is using T-62 clones with a massive 125mm main gun and ATGMs on them (something ROK doesn't do)? The answer's likely no, and that concept ends up being pretty common when comparing the two. The main difference is in air power, but ROK air power is EXTREMELY susceptible to DPRK ballistic missiles, given they only operate out of roughly 4-6 air bases. The general idea is to rapidly halt and hold, and wait for US forces to come in, where ROK and US combine to overwhelm and defeat DPRK.

韓國(guó)希望能在開戰(zhàn)后的5-30天內(nèi)獨(dú)立作戰(zhàn)，隨后美國(guó)將動(dòng)員軍隊(duì)并加入戰(zhàn)斗。
韓國(guó)可能無(wú)法單憑一己之力擊敗朝鮮。朝鮮的軍隊(duì)太龐大，韓國(guó)的軍隊(duì)無(wú)法擊敗他們。例如，K2坦克可以說(shuō)是世界上最好的坦克之一，然而老舊的M48坦克幾乎占了他們坦克數(shù)量的一半。韓國(guó)軍隊(duì)是裝備新舊武器的混合體，而且舊武器裝備比新的多。如果你的坦克部隊(duì)大部分是M48，而你的敵人裝備的是T-62克隆版，擁有巨大的125毫米主炮和反坦克導(dǎo)彈(韓國(guó)沒有)，那么即使韓國(guó)擁有200輛k2又能怎么樣。朝韓的軍事差距主要體現(xiàn)在空中力量方面，但韓國(guó)空中力量極易受到朝鮮彈道導(dǎo)彈的影響，因?yàn)樗麄冎挥写蠹s4-6個(gè)空軍基地。
所以韓國(guó)的總體戰(zhàn)略思想是，遏制住朝鮮的攻勢(shì)并堅(jiān)守住，然后等待美軍加入戰(zhàn)場(chǎng)，韓國(guó)和美國(guó)聯(lián)合起來(lái)打敗朝鮮。

Cal_Ibre
Happy to see someone point this out. This is the real reason for the carriers and the most sensible approach to fighting the North. Northern infrastructure is atrocious and the center of North Korea is mountainous. The northern advance will be supplied mainly by two narrow highways in the Southwest of the country, and an amphibious landing could easily cut them.

很高興看到有人指出這一點(diǎn)。這是韓國(guó)建造航母的真正原因，也是對(duì)抗北方的最明智的方法。朝鮮的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施非常差，而且朝鮮的中部是山區(qū)。向南進(jìn)攻將主要依靠該國(guó)西南部?jī)蓷l狹窄的公路，兩棲登陸可以很容易地切斷他們。

clorox901
Korea should develop its own defense industry, to wean itself off from the USA and gain strategic autonomy.

韓國(guó)應(yīng)該發(fā)展自己的國(guó)防工業(yè)，擺脫對(duì)美國(guó)的依賴，獲得戰(zhàn)略自主權(quán)。

emprahsFury
I agree with the conclusion that SK does not need an aircraft carrier, but the supercilious tone of this article is hard to bear.

我同意韓國(guó)不需要航母的結(jié)論，但這篇文章傲慢的語(yǔ)氣讓人難以忍受。

Peatey
South Korea is a shrimp among 4 whales (USA, Russia, China, Japan) and North Korea. It must build credible defense against North Korea to deter, but it cannot possibly build credible defense against the whales.
Historically it has alternated between being a territory of China and Japan. So it needs a protector. Only USA can project power enough to protect Korea. So it must be useful to the USA.
What will be useful to USA? Like the UK, an expeditionary force combined with a carrier or two to be a member of a coalition of the willing. That is the road to survival for Korea. The carrier mission is not force projection on the coast of North Korea. It’s to join the US and Japan in the blockade of China in 2030.
It’s the same reason Korea joined the Vietnam War and UK joined US in Iraq.

韓國(guó)是四頭鯨魚(美國(guó)、俄羅斯、中國(guó)、日本)和朝鮮中間的一只小蝦。它必須建立針對(duì)朝鮮的可靠防御來(lái)進(jìn)行威懾，它無(wú)法建立針對(duì)鯨魚的可靠防御。
歷史上，它曾是中國(guó)和日本的領(lǐng)土。所以它需要一個(gè)保護(hù)者。只有美國(guó)能投射足夠的力量來(lái)保護(hù)韓國(guó)。所以航母肯定對(duì)美國(guó)是有用的。
什么對(duì)美國(guó)有用?就像英國(guó)一樣，一支以一兩艘航母為核心組建起來(lái)的遠(yuǎn)征軍，加入美國(guó)主導(dǎo)的軍事聯(lián)盟。這就是韓國(guó)的生存之路。韓國(guó)建造航母并不是要對(duì)朝鮮進(jìn)行軍力投射。而是在2030年加入美國(guó)和日本對(duì)中國(guó)的封鎖。
這和朝鮮加入越南戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)、英國(guó)加入伊拉克戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的原因一樣。

Fonference_Cun
You are making some astoundingly nonsensical points here.
(1) What use would the Americans have for a Korean aircraft carrier? Americans build it bigger, and run it better. From the perspective of the wider US-Korea alliance, a Korean aircraft carrier is at best a nuisance to the US, and a dangerous distraction away from the threat posed by Pyongyang.
(2) Korea did not alternate between being a territory of China and Japan. This is the biggest mistake that pop Western "geopolitical analysts" make.
Japan's influence in Korea was always limited, as it was always an inward-looking country, save for the brief period of the Imjin War in the late 16th century, and during the late 19th century to 1945, during the period of Japanese imperialism. Japan has never attempted a foreign expansion outside of these relatively brief time periods.
China was more assertive towards Korea due to its land connection, but Chinese hegemony was never firmly established until the Mongol Yuan dynasty crushed Goryeo in the 13th century. Even then, Korea was not a "territory".

你的觀點(diǎn)非?；闹?。
（1）美國(guó)人要一艘韓國(guó)航空母艦有什么用?美國(guó)人造的航母更大，運(yùn)用地更好。從美韓同盟的宏觀角度來(lái)看，韓國(guó)建造航空母艦對(duì)美國(guó)來(lái)說(shuō)更多是一種負(fù)擔(dān)，反而分散了人們的注意力，使人們忽視了朝鮮的威脅。
（2）韓國(guó)要么曾是中國(guó)的領(lǐng)土，要么曾是日本的領(lǐng)土。這是西方“地緣政治分析師”犯的最大錯(cuò)誤。
日本在朝鮮的影響一直有限，因?yàn)槌r一直是一個(gè)封閉的國(guó)家，除了16世紀(jì)末短暫的壬辰戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)，以及19世紀(jì)末到1945年的日據(jù)時(shí)期。在這些相對(duì)短暫的時(shí)期之外，日本從未將勢(shì)力擴(kuò)展到朝鮮半島。
由于領(lǐng)土接壤，中國(guó)對(duì)朝鮮的影響力更強(qiáng)，但中國(guó)從未在半島建立牢固的霸權(quán)，直到蒙元在13世紀(jì)摧毀了高麗。即使在那時(shí)，韓國(guó)也不是蒙元的“領(lǐng)土”。

Peatey
You’re stating conventional Korean narrative, convenient for a Korean. Read similar narrative from the perspective of Polish.
You’re free to use whatever semantic you want: territory, vassal, second-tier ally in sphere of influence The degree of Korea’s independence is negatively correlated with the degree of internal cohesiveness of its neighbors.
I told you what the use US has: another carrier and another member of “coalition of the willing”. Yes, Korea (like UK) will be either the unit thrown into the meat-grinder (Korea in Vietnam) or non-critical but still useful flank support (UK in Iraq). USA still finds it useful.
Stop thinking that USA still has super-priority interest on North Korea. USSR is no more. South Korea has to stay useful in a different way. As usual, it’ll mean more payment, both directly as well as indirect (contribution of military force).

你只是在重復(fù)韓國(guó)人的一貫說(shuō)法，韓國(guó)人當(dāng)然這樣想。波蘭也可以給出同樣的說(shuō)辭。
你可以隨心所欲地玩弄文字游戲:領(lǐng)土、附屬國(guó)、勢(shì)力范圍內(nèi)的二級(jí)盟友。
但是從歷史的角度看，韓國(guó)的獨(dú)立程度一般與其鄰國(guó)的穩(wěn)定程度呈負(fù)相關(guān)。鄰國(guó)越穩(wěn)定，韓國(guó)的獨(dú)立程度越低，反之亦然。
我告訴過(guò)你，韓國(guó)建造航母對(duì)加入美國(guó)軍事聯(lián)盟體系很有用。是的，韓國(guó)軍隊(duì)要么被扔進(jìn)絞肉機(jī)(越南戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng))，要么做一些不重要但仍然有用的輔助支援(英國(guó)在伊拉克)。韓國(guó)建造航母對(duì)美國(guó)來(lái)說(shuō)是有用的。
不要認(rèn)為美國(guó)有多關(guān)注朝鮮。蘇聯(lián)已經(jīng)不復(fù)存在了。韓國(guó)必須以另一種方式保持有用。和往常一樣，這將意味著更多的資金投入，以及直接的和間接的軍事貢獻(xiàn)。

Fonference_Cun
whatever semantic you want: territory, vassal, second-tier ally in sphere of influence, trading partner that persistently runs deficit.
These are not semantics. Those words have vastly different meanings, and have vastly different consequences in real life. For example, California is a "territory" of the United States; Jordan is a "second-tier ally in sphere of influence" to that same country. Do you just wave about and scoff at the different political statuses between California and Jordan too?
Maybe the Koreans and the Poles obxt to this sort of deliberate obfuscation of their historical relationships with their larger neighbors, precisely because it comes from a position of feigned ignorance and contempt, which you seem to display.
And imagine thinking that Pyongyang isn't a concern to the US. NK in itself may not be a huge threat, but it is a massive land bridge that connects China to a major US ally. People always seem to forget that PRC and NK are allied, and that they will act in concert against South Korea and Japan in emergencies.
And now, South Korea wants to spend billions, billions that could have gone to anti-NK or anti-China defense, on an expeditionary fleet that will frankly add little value compared to a US carrier group. And you think the Americans will be happy about that?

這些不是文字游戲。這些詞有著截然不同的含義，在現(xiàn)實(shí)生活中也有著截然不同的政治意義。例如，加利福尼亞是美國(guó)的“領(lǐng)地”;約旦是美國(guó)“勢(shì)力范圍內(nèi)的二級(jí)盟友”。
你能說(shuō)加州和約旦的政治地位相同嗎?
也許韓國(guó)人和波蘭人反對(duì)這種故意混淆他們與鄰國(guó)歷史關(guān)系的做法，這種做法來(lái)自一種無(wú)知和傲慢的立場(chǎng)態(tài)度，而你似乎正在表現(xiàn)出這種態(tài)度。
想象一下，美國(guó)對(duì)朝鮮不感興趣。朝鮮本身不是一個(gè)巨大的威脅，但它是一座巨大的大陸橋，連接著中國(guó)和美國(guó)的主要盟友。人們似乎總是忘記中國(guó)和朝鮮是盟友，他們會(huì)在緊急情況下聯(lián)合起來(lái)對(duì)付韓國(guó)和日本。
現(xiàn)在，韓國(guó)想要花費(fèi)數(shù)十億美元，數(shù)十億美元本來(lái)可以用于加強(qiáng)對(duì)朝鮮或?qū)χ袊?guó)的防御，坦白地說(shuō)，與美國(guó)航母戰(zhàn)斗群相比，韓國(guó)航母艦隊(duì)的價(jià)值微乎其微。你覺得美國(guó)人會(huì)高興嗎

mrchaotica
The Australian military expert was inspired by the fact that his home country, Australia, collects huge taxes while failing to build up its own defence industry.
Australia has a vast territory, is a large agricultural country and rich in resources. As a result, manufacturing accounts for a very small share of the Australian economy. Australia's efforts to revive its manufacturing sector have foundered after the end of production of the country's proud Holden car brand in 2017.
Australia's first indigenous submarine has fallen short of expectations despite a programme to build it on a budget twice as large as planned. The Australian navy's first Aegis destroyer, which is 70 percent larger than the South Korean Navy's Sejong King and has a budget two and a half times larger, has come under heavy criticism within Australia.
Australia's new generation of conventional submarines has yet to be assembled, but they are already over their original planned budget and could cost Won6tn each. The new generation submarine development programme, which began in 2014, will not complete the first vessel until 2034.
Another project is the Canberra class multi-purpose landing ship. The Spanish-designed, Australian-built Canberra-class multi-purpose landing ship costs more than three times as much as its Spanish counterpart,
Australia's original plan for the Canberra class landing ship to carry the F-35B turned out to require a massive makeover and ended up becoming a "half-carrier" of sorts. That is to say, Australia spent 2.5 trillion won and failed to build a real aircraft carrier.
Seeing that the country has wasted nearly 100 trillion won in taxes on its defense industry for decades without success, it is natural for Australian military experts to be negative about South Korea spending 2.5 trillion won on a carrier.

澳大利亞軍事專家之所以有這樣的想法，是因?yàn)樗淖鎳?guó)澳大利亞在收取巨額稅金的同時(shí)，卻沒有建立起本土國(guó)防產(chǎn)業(yè)。
澳大利亞擁有廣闊領(lǐng)土，是農(nóng)業(yè)大國(guó)和資源富國(guó)。因此，制造業(yè)在澳大利亞經(jīng)濟(jì)中所占的比重非常小。2017年澳大利亞引以自豪的汽車品牌“HOLDEN”停產(chǎn)后，澳大利亞想要重振本國(guó)制造業(yè)的努力不斷失敗。
澳大利亞第一艘國(guó)產(chǎn)潛艇建造項(xiàng)目的預(yù)算雖然比計(jì)劃增加了一倍，但潛艇的性能沒有達(dá)到預(yù)期水平。澳大利亞海軍第一艘宙斯盾驅(qū)逐艦的體積比韓國(guó)海軍“世宗大王”號(hào)宙斯盾驅(qū)逐艦大70%，預(yù)算卻是“世宗大王”號(hào)的2.5倍，在澳大利亞內(nèi)部受到了強(qiáng)烈批評(píng)。
澳大利亞新一代常規(guī)潛艇目前尚未開始組裝，但已經(jīng)超過(guò)了當(dāng)初計(jì)劃的預(yù)算，一艘潛艇的價(jià)格可能達(dá)6萬(wàn)億韓元。從2014年開始實(shí)施的新一代潛艇開發(fā)計(jì)劃，要到2034年才能完成第一艘潛艇的建造。
另一個(gè)項(xiàng)目是“堪培拉”級(jí)多用途登陸艦。采用西班牙設(shè)計(jì)，澳大利亞建造的“堪培拉”級(jí)多用途登陸艦的價(jià)格，比西班牙版的價(jià)格高了3倍還不止，
澳大利亞原本計(jì)劃讓“堪培拉”級(jí)登陸艦搭載F-35B，后來(lái)發(fā)現(xiàn)需要大規(guī)模改造，結(jié)果勉強(qiáng)成為了“半個(gè)航母”。也就是說(shuō)，澳大利亞花費(fèi)2.5萬(wàn)億韓元，卻沒能建造出真正的航空母艦。
看到祖國(guó)數(shù)十年來(lái)在國(guó)防產(chǎn)業(yè)里浪費(fèi)了近100萬(wàn)億韓元的稅金卻沒能成功，澳大利亞軍事專家對(duì)韓國(guó)花2.5萬(wàn)億韓元建造航母持否定態(tài)度自然是理所當(dāng)然的事情。